Local Labor Markets in Mexico by Russov, Alexander
Local Labor Markets in Mexico
by
Alexander Russov
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Economics)
in the University of Michigan
2018
Doctoral Committee:
Professor John Bound, Chair
Assistant Professor Achyuta Adhvaryu





c© Alexander Russov 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
CHAPTER
I. Fathers and Sons: Labor Market Opportunities and Fertility . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Data, background, and trends in employment and fertility . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Data description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Background on fertility and employment . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.3 Employment and fertility correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Identifying the causal impact of local labor market shocks . . . . . . 11
1.3.1 A measure of predicted employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.2 Results using instrumental variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.3 Reconciling the IV and OLS estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.4 An approach robust to weak instruments . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Timing of births and effects on permanent fertility . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.1 Birth order and lagged effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.2 Time series properties of employment . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5 How do changes in employment affect wages? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6 The impact of maquiladora employment on fertility . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.6.1 Context behind the expansion of maquiladoras . . . . . . . 27
1.6.2 How maquiladoras affect fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.7 Migration, robustness, and alternative specifications . . . . . . . . . 30
1.7.1 Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.7.2 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.9 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.10 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
ii
II. The Impact of Relative Wages on Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.2 Conceptual framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.3 Data and background on wages and marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3.1 Data description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3.2 Wage gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3.3 Marriage in Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.4 Identification of relative labor demand shocks for women . . . . . . . 73
2.4.1 Relative bargaining power in the labor market . . . . . . . 73
2.4.2 Labor demand variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5 Estimating the impact of relative bargaining power on marriage . . . 77
2.5.1 Results of the estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.5.2 Other household outcomes and heterogeneity in effects . . . 79
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.7 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.8 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
III. The Wage Distribution, Local Labor Market Outcomes, and the
Chinese Import Shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.2 Chinese growth, manufacturing, and regional exposure in Mexico . . 103
3.2.1 Chinese export growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.2.2 Industry structure and regional variation . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.3 Empirical estimation of China’s export growth . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.3.1 Conceptual framework for evaluating regional impacts of
China’s rise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.3.2 Empirical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.3.3 Data and measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.3.4 Impacts on local labor markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.3.5 Wage effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.3.6 Impacts on the conditional wage distribution . . . . . . . . 115
3.4 Robustness of the results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.4.1 Impacts on wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.4.2 Including the effects of export competition . . . . . . . . . 119
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.6 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.7 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133




1.1 General fertility rates across Mexican federal entities . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.2 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.3 Estimation of the relationship between employment and fertility . . . . . . 48
1.4 First stage and OLS, IV, and RF of impact of employment on fertility . . . 49
1.5 First stage regressions for men’s and women’s employment . . . . . . . . . 50
1.6 Impact of male and female employment on fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.7 Impacts on fertility rates by birth order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.8 Impact of current and lagged predicted employment on fertility . . . . . . . 53
1.9 Decomposition of predicted employment into high and low frequency com-
ponents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.10 Relationship between gender intensity of sector and wages . . . . . . . . . 55
1.11 Impacts on the wage ratio and wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
1.12 Impacts on earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.13 First stage regressions for maquiladora employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1.14 OLS, IV, and reduced form results using maquiladora employment . . . . . 59
1.15 Impacts on population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.16 Using a Bartik-style IV to identify the impact of employment on fertility . 61
1.17 Impact of male and female employment on fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.1 Individual wage regression results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.2 Individual wage regression results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.3 Individual wage regression results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.4 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.5 Impact of relative labor demand on marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.6 Impact of relative labor demand on family-related outcomes . . . . . . . . 95
2.7 Impact of relative labor demand on marriage by age grouping . . . . . . . . 96
2.8 Impact of relative labor demand on marriage across regions . . . . . . . . . 97
2.9 Impact of relative labor demand on marriage by educational grouping . . . 98
3.1 Trade Values of Imports from China and the U.S. into Mexico . . . . . . . 133
3.2 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.3 Impact of Chinese import exposure on manufacturing share of working-age
population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
iv
3.4 Impact of Chinese import exposure on human capital and employment-
related outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.5 Impact of Chinese import exposure on wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.6 Impact of Chinese import exposure on wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
3.7 Impact of Chinese import exposure on wages and earnings . . . . . . . . . 139




1.1 Fertility rates across Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.2 Fertility rate over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.3 Standardized proportion of men and women in employment . . . . . . . . . 37
1.4 Confidence set with linear population controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.5 Confidence set with quadratic population controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.6 Confidence set with cubic population controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.7 Male to female earnings ratio in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.8 Municipalities by maximal share of employment in maquiladoras . . . . . . 42
1.9 Employment for men and women in maquiladoras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.10 Municipalities by female share of maquiladora labor force . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.11 Density of employment across maquiladoras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.1 Male share of 3-digit sectors between 1990 and 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.2 Female to male wage ratio over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.3 Mean employment-to-population ratio of women across years of schooling . 85
2.4 Map of Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.5 Mean employment-to-population rates of women across regions in Mexico . 87
2.6 Mean employment-to-population rates of women across educational groups
in Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.7 Mean marriage rates by age group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.1 Growth in Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.2 Growth in the Value of Imports from China over Time . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.3 Growth in the Share of Imports from China over Time . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.4 Growth in Imports into the U.S. over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.5 Wage growth across Mexican Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.6 Import exposure across Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.7 Differences in Mean Log Wages across the Wage Distribution . . . . . . . . 129
3.8 The Impact of Chinese Exports on the Conditional Wage Distribution on
the Full Working-age Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
3.9 The Impact of Chinese Exports on the Conditional Wage Distribution on Men131
3.10 The Impact of Chinese Exports on the Conditional Wage Distribution on
Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
vi
3.11 The Impact of Chinese Exports on the Conditional Wage Distribution on
Manufacturing Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.12 The Impact of Chinese Exports on the Conditional Wage Distribution on
Non-Manufacturing Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
vii
ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies how shocks to regional economies in Mexico shape employment,
wages, human capital, fertility, and marriage in the short and medium run.
The first chapter studies the causal impact of fluctuations in men’s and women’s labor
market opportunities on fertility. I evaluate how jobs in the formal sector, in manufactur-
ing, and at export-assembly plants (maquiladoras) in Mexico shape childbirth, selection into
fertility, and the timing of births using two complementary identification strategies. The
first strategy exploits exogenous shocks to demand for male versus female labor using a re-
gion’s industrial structure, and the second uses establishment-level data from the universe
of maquiladoras to construct an instrumental variable based on large expansions and con-
tractions in plant employment. Results show that positive shocks in the short run to men’s
employment have large, positive effects on fertility, whereas positive shocks to women’s em-
ployment have small net impacts in the short run.
The second chapter tests the predictions of traditional models of the family. These
models assume that men specialize in market work, whereas women specialize in household
production. An implication of these models is that increases in women’s wages, relative to
men’s wages, decrease the gains to marriage. Previous work has struggled with generating
an accurate proxy for women’s potential wages in middle-income countries, where women’s
viii
labor force participation is often low and subject to selection bias. I create a measure of
women’s potential wages in the market, which applies regardless if women actually work,
and show that the predictions of the models hold in Mexico. I also find that women are
more likely to be heads of households and to be single mothers in response to increases in
their relative wages.
The third chapter evaluates the causal impact of Chinese export shocks on Mexico’s
local labor markets. The findings indicate that important margins of adjustment to labor
demand shocks in Mexico differ from those found in other studies on wealthy countries.
Municipalities with greater exposure to Chinese trade penetration do not experience bigger
drops in the share of the population employed in manufacturing, nor are other measures on
the extensive margin of employment affected. Instead, I find large negative impacts on wages,
human capital levels, and the skilled-labor share of manufacturing. I also find consistently
negative impacts across the conditional wage distribution, with workers in higher quantiles
in manufacturing suffering slightly larger wage decreases than workers in lower quantiles.
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CHAPTER I
Fathers and Sons: Labor Market Opportunities and
Fertility
1.1 Introduction
This paper investigates how annual fluctuations in labor markets in Mexico for men and
women affect decisions about fertility. In the last few decades, many developing countries
have industrialized, and large numbers of women have entered the labor force for the first
time. Much of the rise in women’s employment is due to the growth of export-oriented
manufacturing employment, especially in low-skill jobs. This study contributes to a recent,
growing literature evaluating the consequences of this remarkable transition in women’s
labor force attachment on families’ decisions about fertility and marriage. Unlike other work
that focuses solely on positive shocks to women’s labor market opportunities (Heath and
Mubarak, 2015; Sivasankaran, 2014; Jensen, 2012), however, I study both expansions and
contractions in employment for men and women and show that labor market shocks for the
former also matter in fertility decisions.
I exploit multiple sources of data over different time periods to build two complementary
instrumental variables identification strategies to study how fluctuations in labor market
opportunities in the formal sector for both men and women affect fertility, selection into
fertility, and the timing of births. The first approach generates a predicted measure of
1
employment, building on an approach commonly used in labor and urban economics to
isolate exogenous shocks to labor demand, to identify how these local labor demand shocks
shift fertility. The second approach uses a restricted-access, establishment-level dataset on
the universe of maquiladoras (export-assembly plants) to construct an instrument based on
expansions and contractions at the factory-level.
I find that increases in labor market opportunities for men have large, positive impacts
on fertility, whereas increases in women’s labor market opportunities show negligible impacts
on total fertility. These results are consistent with neoclassical theories of fertility dating
back to Becker (1960): families choose whether to have a child in each period, and changes
in employment for men and women generate income and substitution effects that alter the
proportion of households choosing to have a child.
This paper also evaluates how employment dynamics impact fertility. Distributed lag
models provide evidence that the immediate effect of demand shocks for women’s employment
is negative, indicating that substitution effects dominate income effects in the near term. The
net effect in the long run, however, is close to zero, indicating that employment shocks for
women are not associated with large changes in total fertility.
I then decompose the variation in employment shocks into lower-frequency and higher-
frequency components. I find that high-frequency negative demand shocks to women’s labor
increase fertility. As high-frequency movements in employment reflect transitory, unantic-
ipated changes in labor market opportunities, it is likely that these accelerate the timing
of fertility as families take advantage of the reduced opportunity cost of having children
(Heckman and Walker, 1990). On the other hand, I find that low-frequency movements in
women’s labor market opportunities are not associated with significant impacts on fertility.
This is consistent with income and substitution effects roughly offsetting each other in the
long run.
The relationship between female labor force participation and fertility remains a matter
of debate (Engelhardt and Prskawetz, 2004; Ko¨gel, 2004; Mishra, Nielsen, and Smyth, 2010).
2
Lim (2009) notes that the cross-sectional relationship within countries has become much less
steep across time, and in some regions there is no relationship at all.1 If women’s opportunity
cost of time, measured by wages or hours worked, is a central mechanism driving fertility
decisions, as in neoclassical models following Becker (1960), then why is the relationship not
robust across time and space?2
That theory does not provide a firm prediction about how changes in labor markets
should affect fertility may explain some of the differing results across studies. The em-
pirical analysis in this paper is informed by two points. First, labor demand shocks may
lead to heterogeneous effects that differ across households, depending on initial labor force
participation, labor market frictions (Da Rocha and Fuster, 2006), availability of childcare
arrangements (Del Boca, 2002), other policies that alter the incentives to have children, or
the quality of the work itself.3
Second, the interaction between labor markets for men and women is critical. The bulk of
1 She shows that there is no clear pattern in Asia-Pacific countries, while both female labor force partici-
pation and fertility fell in many countries in the Middle East and North Africa in the 1990s.
2 A neoclassical labor supply model predicts income and substitution effects resulting from increased
wages. There is no theoretical reason to assume that substitution effects will dominate income effects for
women, though existing research focusing on both men’s and women’s labor market opportunities (e.g.
Schultz, 1985; Schaller, 2016) supports the view that substitution effects dominate. Typically, it is thought
that at low wages, increases in wages lead to more hours worked as the substitution effect of higher wages
dominates the income effect. This results in less time for leisure and raises the cost of having a child. At
higher wages, increases in the wage may lead to reduced hours of work if the income effect dominates the
substitution effect. Of course, as noted by Ahn and Mira (2002), in reality most individuals do not pick
their optimal hours of work. Imagine, for simplicity, that work options are binary: an individual may either
accept a full-time job or not. If she is already working, then an exogenous shock to her wage, say through
a positive labor demand shock, induces only an income effect. That implies that an increase in a woman’s
wage would lead to increased fertility, assuming children are normal goods. Lindo (2010) and Black et al.
(2013) provide evidence that children are indeed normal goods.
3 Employment is not merely associated with changes in wages and the cost of time. Lim (2009) argues that
“increases in labor force participation have not been matched by improvements in job quality and that the
kinds of jobs women are engaged in and their working conditions have not led to their true socio-economic
empowerment, have not provided adequately satisfying alternatives to childbearing or have not involved
serious incompatibility between paid and unpaid work.” She suggests a number of mechanisms linked to
women’s employment that should lower fertility, such as whether the quality of the work enhances women’s
status, thereby increasing their independence and bargaining power within the household. Other research
(N˜opo, 2012; World Bank, 2011) documents that many women’s jobs in Latin America are low-wage and
highly segregated from men’s jobs, implying that employment opportunities may not sufficiently lift women’s
status to change fertility decisions. The findings in this paper show that while labor demand shocks to men’s
labor increase wages, labor demand shocks to women’s labor actually lead wages to decline. Part of this
result, however, may be due to changes in the composition of the labor force.
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the research on fertility focuses exclusively on either male wages or female wages, aggregate
unemployment, or net job changes for women only, or it devises a single ad hoc measure,
such as the ratio of male wages to female wages or the female share of exports (e.g. Do,
Levchenko, and Raddatz, 2016), even though the motivation for such work relies on how wage
changes separately affect income and the cost of time for men and women. Approaches that
cannot distinguish male labor demand shocks from female labor demand shocks potentially
suffer serious omitted variables biases when the fertility decision depends jointly on male and
female income and time.4 In particular, the relationship between fertility and the woman’s
wage may depend on whether one conditions on her partner’s wage or not, and the same
applies to the man.5
Furthermore, existing work is not always clear regarding what parameter is being iden-
tified, either from a theoretical or policy-based perspective. For instance, increases in wages
may induce increases or decreases in hours worked among those already working (especially
if the sample comes from a developed country), leading to an ambiguous connection between
wages and female time use. Unemployment rates suffer from well-known issues relating to
indeterminate changes in the numerator and denominator (since both employment and labor
force participation may change across business cycles). Wages or earnings, especially in a
setting like Mexico where labor force participation among women remains low, can suffer
from severe composition bias (Solon, Barsky, and Parker, 1994). To address these issues,
my analysis focuses on changes in net formal sector employment for men and women. Thus,
I identify the net impact of increases in formal sector employment for men and women on
fertility.
This paper also contributes to a large literature (e.g. Butz and Ward, 1979; MacDonald,
4 Had I used a measure of the ratio of men’s to women’s employment, I would have incorrectly found that
short-run growth in women’s employment decreases fertility, when the effect is driven by short-run growth
in men’s employment increasing fertility.
5 Summarizing a major strand of the literature, Jones et al. (2010) note that the correlation between
fertility and the wife’s wage is usually negative, whether one conditions on the husband’s wage or not; the
unconditional correlation between the husband’s wage and fertility is negative; and lastly, the correlation
between the husband’s wage and fertility, conditioning on the wife’s wage, is either positive or negative,
depending on the study.
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1983, Macunovich, 1995; Currie and Schwandt, 2014) relating fertility rates to the business
cycle, and whether fertility is pro- or countercyclical remains an open question in the liter-
ature. Ahn and Mira (2002) note that in their sample of OECD countries, the relationship
abruptly switched from being negative to positive. They link the change to a new equilib-
rium of high unemployment and higher female labor force participation in the OECD. Most
of this work focuses on wealthy nations, and one of the contributions of this study is to
fill the gap by focusing on a developing country. Moreover, much of this literature focuses
on time series regressions that take the country as a unit of observation, but these studies
do not identify the impacts of local labor market demand shocks on fertility; for instance,
nation-wide changes in policy on employer-provided childcare can induce changes in work
and fertility that are unrelated to demand shocks.
Finally, because the time and resource costs of children extend across time6, it is impor-
tant to consider how a dynamic theory alters the predictions of the static model. Consider a
woman who loses her job or whose hours of work decrease. In the near term, the substitution
effect may dominate the income effect and lead her to increase time in child care, potentially
increasing fertility. However, if the job loss or wage reduction is due to a widespread nega-
tive economic shock, such as a recession, it may lead her to change her expectations about
her future employment prospects. If she now anticipates permanently lower income in the
future, then the job loss could lead the income effect to dominate the substitution effect and
hence lead to lower fertility. A more nuanced alternative is that she may increase fertility
in the near term, when the opportunity cost of her time is lower, but decrease fertility in
the long-run.7 The findings in this paper provide support for exactly this interpretation.
In sum, changes in economic conditions can also alter expectations about future economic
possibilities, which may also affect how families space births across time.8
6 Becker (1960) originally compared children to durable goods. A´lvarez-Parra, Brandao-Marques, and
Toledo (2013) show that spending on durable goods is particularly volatile in developing countries, including
Mexico, which is consistent with my finding that fertility strongly responds to the business cycle.
7 The presence of liquidity constraints or uncertainty about future outcomes, however, may prevent house-
holds from fully optimizing across time, implying that even shocks of a short duration matter for households.
8 An additional line of thinking, dating back at least to Leibenstein (1957), notes that intergenerational
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1.2 Data, background, and trends in employment and fertility
1.2.1 Data description
The fertility data in this paper come from the Mexican National Institute of Statistics
and Geography (INEGI). These vital statistics data contain individual-level information on
all births, including parents’ ages, education, type of union, and the municipality they live
in. I use the month of birth variable and lag it by nine months to proxy for the year of
conception.
Demographic data on municipalities come from the 2005 and 2010 Mexican censuses,
and demographic information for intercensal years is linearly interpolated. Employment
data come from two sources. The main analysis uses data from the Mexican Social Secu-
rity Institute (IMSS), which administers the provision of health care, pensions, and social
security. All employees in the formal private sector are obligated to register with the IMSS,
so these administrative, job-level data contain employment information on the universe of
jobs in the formal private sector. I also use data from the Survey of Occupation and Em-
ployment (ENOE), which tracks Mexico’s labor force and provides detailed information on
the characteristics of employment. Unlike the IMSS data, it has the advantage of providing
information on employment in all sectors of the economy, but as a survey it contains only a
small proportion of formal sector employment and lacks information on some municipalities
entirely. The main analysis focuses on years 2005 to 2013, which is the set of years for which
IMSS and fertility data are available.
Data on maquiladora line-employment come from the Maquiladora Export Industry
Dataset. INEGI collected these data at the monthly level from all export-assembly plants
in Mexico from 1990 to 2006. These data contain plant identifiers9 as well as a variety of
transfers play a major role in encouraging fertility in developing countries. Although I do not pursue the
study of the intergenerational transmission of fertility here, it is worth keeping in mind that in countries like
Mexico, where some individuals belong to a formal sector that provides social security, and others belong to
an informal sector without similar protections, the implications of increased jobs and changes in wages may
differ in regions with few formal sector jobs.
9 Data with plant identifiers must be accessed on-site at INEGI’s microdata lab in Mexico City.
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information on inputs, expenditures, sales, and value-added. The period of study encom-
passes major changes in Mexico’s exposure to trade, including the signing of NAFTA, the
peso crisis, and China’s entry into the WTO.
1.2.2 Background on fertility and employment
Figure 1 shows the tremendous variation in general fertility rates10 across municipalities
across Mexico in 2010. These, unsurprisingly, are highly correlated with local incomes, stocks
of human capital, urbanization rates, and proportion of speakers of indigenous languages.
Mexico’s total fertility rate peaked at above seven children per woman in the early 1960’s
and then entered a period of sharp, continuous decline; it is currently estimated at being
just over two children per woman. General fertility rates are also declining: Figure 2 shows
the overall trajectory in general fertility rates for the country since 2006, and Table 1 lists
fertility rates for federal entities in 2005 and 2013. The most recent trend continues to be
downward, but the overall trend in Figure 2 masks substantial variation across the country.
For instance, splitting the sample of municipalities into quartiles by levels of urbanization
indicates that mostly rural municipalities actually experienced a positive bump in fertility
in 2009, the year of the U.S. financial crisis spilling over into Mexico.
While fertility was steadily trending downward prior to 2009, the formal sector employ-
ment to population ratio was increasing for both men and women, as indicated in Figure 3.
Formal sector employment then contracted sharply in 2009 and has been slowly recovering
since. Manufacturing employment in the formal sector has experienced the same trends,
but witnessed a much sharper decline in 2009. As has been the case in the U.S. in recent
recessions, the men’s employment to population ratio suffered a substantially larger decrease
in 2009, though within manufacturing women experienced a slightly sharper decline. The
overall trends for men and women in employment, though, are similar, which makes con-
necting aggregate changes in fertility to changes in either men’s or women’s labor market
10 I define the general fertility rate as the number of births per 1000 women of ages 15-44.
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opportunities (without conditioning on the other gender’s job prospects) problematic.
1.2.3 Employment and fertility correlations
Consider, as a benchmark, the case where fertility is a function of overall job opportuni-
ties. I first estimate the following regression:
ym,t = λ+ βEm,t +αf(X)m,t + γm + δt + θTrends + εm,t (1.1)
The outcome is the natural logarithm of the general fertility rate11, measured as the
number of births per 1000 women aged 15-44.12 Em,t measures the natural logarithm of
total formal sector employment in municipality m in year t for individuals aged 15-44. I also
include municipality fixed effects, which control for time-invariant unobservable characteris-
tics specific to each locality; year fixed effects, which control for annual shocks to fertility;
and linear state time trends, which control for smoothly evolving determinants of fertility
that vary across states (e.g. if regions with high fertility are converging to the fertility rates
of regions with low fertility).13 Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level to
account for serial correlation within municipalities (Bertrand et al., 2004).
I do not calculate an unemployment rate as is commonly done in the literature (e.g.
Dehijia and Lleras-Muney, 2004; O¨rsal and Goldstein, 2010; Schaller, 2016) since I only
have administrative data on the formal sector, which accounts for fewer than half of all
jobs in Mexico. To account for the potentially complex relationship between formal and
informal sector jobs, I flexibly control for the natural logarithm of the population of men and
women aged 15-44 in the function f(X). These regressions are weighted by the population
of women aged 15-44 in each municipality, averaged across years. I limit the sample to
11 Results are similar if using the raw fertility rate. Using natural logarithms on both the lefthand and
righthand sides facilitates the interpretation of the coefficients of interest as elasticities.
12 This is equivalent to simply using the log of the number of births when the log of population of women
aged 15-44 is used as a control.
13 Results are unchanged when using quadratic time trends, and results using state-by-year fixed effects,
which are shown in the robustness section, are similar.
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those municipalities with employment in manufacturing to make results comparable between
samples using all employment or only employment in manufacturing.
The results in Column 1 in Table 3 show that fertility is procyclical, and whether changes
in population are accounted for linearly or in a more flexible way does not alter the main
results. Following the framework established earlier, I examine whether manufacturing jobs
have a similar effect on employment and re-estimate equation (1) using only formal sector jobs
in manufacturing. The results are qualitatively similar using both measures of employment,
although the magnitudes are much smaller when focusing on the subset of the formal sector
in manufacturing, which is in line with manufacturing employment making up a smaller
fraction of the employment stock in municipalities.14
Labor markets in Mexico are segmented by sex.15 For instance, production in garments,
toys, musical instruments, perfumes, and cosmetics are the most female-centric sectors within
manufacturing, while alcohol, automotive, and concrete manufacturing are the most male-
intensive. As a result, labor market opportunities for men and women differ widely across
municipalities and time, depending on the share of industries in each location and the growth
rate in employment across time. To test whether men’s and women’s employment have
differential impacts on fertility, I estimate the following specification:
ym,t = βmaleEmale,m,t + βfemaleEfemale,m,t +αf(X)m,t + γm + δt + θTrends + εm,t (1.2)
Results are in Table 3. The estimates for female employment are negative but small and
statistically insignificant, while the estimates for men are larger and statistically significant
at the 1% level. Note that the magnitudes can be interpreted as elasticities. Controlling
for female employment and changes in population, the results imply that a 10% increase in
14 Strictly speaking, this interpretation depends on the omitted part of employment being orthogonal to
manufacturing, which is unlikely to hold due to spillovers among sectors, but is a rough approximation of
effects. In a later section, I show instrumental variables results as well as results using only maquiladoras,
which relies on expansions and contractions that are arguably exogenous to shifts in other sectors.
15 Labor market segmentation by sex is common across all countries, even those with high degrees of male-
female equality in other spheres, but developing countries in Latin America are especially likely to show
segmentation (World Bank, 2011).
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formal sector employment for men is associated with a 0.3% increase in fertility rates in that
municipality.
These regressions omit the informal sector, which may have differential impacts on fer-
tility. Employment in the informal sector tends to be countercyclical, and negative shocks
to the formal sector historically have not led to significantly higher unemployment rates in
Mexico. Instead, the informal sector has served as a “safety valve” for individuals on the
margin of losing formal sector employment.16 Since this implies that changes in employment
in the informal sector are themselves outcomes of changes in employment in the formal sector,
estimates that include both informal and formal sector employment should be interpreted
with caution.
Under the theory outlined here, employment in the informal sector should have a smaller
impact than the formal sector on fertility. Even if informal sector jobs do not pay less
than the formal sector17, they do not typically provide childcare, social security, and health
benefits, so the expected income effect for men is smaller. Women are less likely to have
strong attachments to the labor force in the informal sector, so the expected negative effect (if
substitution effects dominate income effects) on fertility from growth in the informal sector
is likely to be smaller as well. Table 3 shows results combining the formal sector data in
the IMSS and data on the informal sector from the ENOE labor force survey, disaggregated
by sex. They are consistent with the theory: estimated coefficients for both male and
female employment in the informal sector are close to zero. Furthermore, the inclusion of
the informal sector does not alter the main results using employment only in the formal
sector.18
16 Early models of labor market segmentation construed the informal market as a separate market that
serves as an alternative to individuals who cannot enter the formal sector, but more recent work has empha-
sized that many workers move voluntarily between the formal and informal sectors (Maloney, 2004). Time
series of employment indicate that, perhaps due to the stickiness of wages in the formal sector, employment
in the informal sector expands during economic crises (Binelli and Attanasio, 2010).
17 Marcouiller et al. (1997) discuss wages in the formal and informal sectors in Mexico.
18 Note the labor force survey does not cover all municipalities in Mexico and only goes back to 2006 in its
current version, so the sample of included municipalities and years is smaller.
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1.3 Identifying the causal impact of local labor market shocks
1.3.1 A measure of predicted employment
The analysis so far has shown that fertility is positively correlated with employment
in the formal sector, and this relationship is driven entirely by male employment. Such a
relationship may not be causal, however. Using local aggregate employment, as opposed to
own-employment, alleviates a major concern about reverse causality: a parent may change
his or her own labor force participation in anticipation of or as a consequence of having a
child.
Nevertheless, using aggregate measures of employment may still not identify the causal
impact of local labor demand shocks on fertility. Potential sources of bias for the fixed effects
estimator include simultaneity, omitted variables, and measurement error. Simultaneity may
arise if women decrease childbearing, leading some to enter the labor force differentially across
municipalities and time in a manner not fully accounted for by the fixed effects employed
here. Such a relationship would lead to a downward bias in estimates on women’s labor
demand.
Omitted factors correlated with labor demand and fertility may also bias estimates. For
instance, La Ferrara, Chong, and Duryea (2012) find that telenovelas decrease fertility in
Brazil. This points to the potential importance of social norms in shaping households’ deci-
sions about women working outside the home and about fertility preference. Furthermore,
linearly interpolating the population between census years may smooth temporary shocks
to population. Such shocks are likely to be positively correlated with employment and the
number of births, leading to an upward bias in the ordinary least squares estimator for both
male and female employment.19
Finally, measurement error in the variable measuring formal sector employment can in-
duce biases in estimates of both men’s and women’s employment. The administrative data
19 Replacing the census population figure with the population estimate from an average of the four quarters
in the subsample of municipalities and years in the ENOE does not alter the results here.
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cover the universe of formal sector employment, so in that sense they are measured without
error. However, some of the movements into and out of the formal sector may represent
firms’ selectively registering with the formal sector in some periods and not in others. This
likely would lead to attenuation bias in the estimates of both coefficients.
To deal with these sources of bias and isolate the impact of changes in local labor demand,
I employ two identification strategies in this paper. The first strategy builds on the approach
originally employed by Bartik (1991) and used in Blanchard and Katz (1992), Bound and
Holzer (2000), and others in urban and labor economics in constructing an instrumental
variable predicting labor demand using a “shift-share index.” I define







to predict the log of employment for group g (men or women) in each municipality m at
each time period t. The numerator in the fraction is equal to employment of group g in
municipality m in industry ind at time 0, that is, the baseline period. The denominator
in the fraction is equal to national employment of group g in industry ind in the baseline
period. If one ignores the last of the two terms in parentheses, then in the baseline period
this expression is equal to actual employment. In subsequent years it deviates from actual
employment because the mix of industries in each municipality is kept constant to address
endogenous changes in the industrial mix resulting from local changes in labor supply. The
instrument predicts local employment by weighting national employment in each industry
with the proportion of employment in that industry located in the municipality in the first
period and summing over all industries, separately for men and women. As is common in
the literature, I subtract local employment from national employment in parentheses so that
the predicted labor market outcome excludes actual local employment. Otherwise, part of
the association between the instrument and actual employment would be mechanical.20
20 In practice, local employment in each municipality is small enough that it makes no difference for the
outcomes in this paper whether it is included in the expression or not, although the power of the instrument
is of course stronger when own-employment is included.
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This methodology relies on a municipality’s industrial mix in the baseline period pre-
dicting outcomes for local workers in subsequent periods. That is, if one municipality has a
large employment share in sectors that employ women, such as textile manufacturing, and
the employment of women in textile manufacturing increases across the country, we would
expect local employment of women to increase. Assuming workers in one sector are compa-
rable across the country, such that a positive (negative) shock nationwide translates into a
positive (negative) shock locally, the IV should predict actual local employment.
To satisfy the exclusion restriction, the predicted employment measure must not be
correlated with local labor supply shocks. This requires that national changes in employment
in a given industry are not due to changes within a single municipality. Mexico consists of
over 2,000 municipalities, with the largest accounting for a little over 1% of the population,
so this is much less of a concern here than in similar studies on the U.S. using each state
as the local labor market. A more subtle point, made in Cosman (2014), is that localities
with a similar mix in sectors may be related in other ways, leading the instrument to pick up
differences associated with a particular industrial mix rather than differences in employment
in that industry.21 He concludes that Bartik-style instruments do indeed predict local changes
in employment from national shocks to industries.
In principle, the shift-share index can be created for any set of industries, but the ar-
gument behind it relies on local changes in employment being sensitive to national trends.
Local industries, such as those in services, are less likely to respond to national changes
in the same industry than sectors that are traded nationally or globally. A demand shock
to internationally traded products, in particular, is likely due to exogenously determined
factors that lead to a push in local employment in sectors making those products. Hence,
I create two measures of predicted employment: one set for men and women employed in
the formal sector, as well as a second set focusing only on manufacturing employment in the
formal sector. Focusing on manufacturing provides other advantages. First, different types
21 Using Monte Carlo trials, Cosman investigates whether such a correlation would lead to a spuriously
strong first stage and finds that the coefficient on the instrument would actually be negative.
13
of manufacturing in Mexico, as in the U.S., are centered on particular regions, leading to
spatial variation in how susceptible places are to exogenous demand shocks. Second, some
industries within manufacturing have been in decline in Mexico during this period, perhaps
due to competition from low-cost Asian producers (especially after China’s entry into the
WTO), but the shocks have not been felt equally across all industries, leading to another
source of spatial variation within regions containing manufacturing employment. Third, to
the extent that different types of employment differentially impact fertility decisions (Lim,
2009), the analysis answers a well-defined question: what impact do the expansion and con-
traction of manufacturing jobs have on fertility? Fourth, focusing on manufacturing makes
the results comparable to a growing literature in economics evaluating how the liberaliza-
tion of trade regimes, leading to large growth in low-skill factory jobs for young women in
developing countries, has affected these women’s lives.
1.3.2 Results using instrumental variables
Table 4 shows the first stage results, as well as the instrumented results and the reduced-
form for equation 1 using all formal sector employment. Predicted employment is highly
correlated with actual employment, and the first stage appears strong. The instrumented
regressions indicate that the elasticity of fertility with respect to employment is slightly
below 0.2. This coefficient is much larger in magnitude than the OLS coefficient, a point to
which I return below.
The theory predicts that exogenous shocks to male and female labor demand differentially
affect fertility decisions. If employment for men mainly translates into income effects, then
we may expect that positive shocks to men’s labor demand should increase fertility. Positive
shocks to women’s labor demand may increase the opportunity cost of having a child, while
also leading to positive income effects, so the net impact of changes in women’s labor market
opportunities is a priori indeterminate. To examine the theory, I return to equation (9)
and instrument employment for men and women with predicted employment for each group.
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First stage results using full formal sector employment and only manufacturing employment
are presented in Table 5. When focusing on all formal sector employment, the IV for women
is strongly correlated with actual female employment, while both IVs have some predictive
power for male employment, although the IV for male employment is greater in magnitude
and slightly more precisely estimated. These results are not surprising: since labor markets
are not perfectly segmented, labor market shocks for one gender are correlated with labor
market shocks for the other gender. When including only manufacturing employment, only
the male IV predicts male employment and only the female IV predicts female employment.
The results of OLS, IV, and reduced form regressions for all formal sector employment and
for manufacturing employment only are in Table 6. The IV coefficients indicate that a 1%
increase in formal sector employment for men raises fertility rates by about 0.3%, depending
on the specification, while an increase in female employment has a small and statistically
insignificant impact on fertility rates. The impacts from manufacturing employment are
roughly half of those including all formal sector employment. To put these numbers in
perspective, Schaller (2016) finds that a 1% increase in unemployment, using a state-level
analysis in the U.S., decreases birth rates by 2.6%. When she disaggregates by gender,
she finds that decreases in male unemployment raise fertility, whereas decreases in female
unemployment lower fertility, with stronger effects for men. My results are broadly consistent
with hers, although the use of unemployment rates in her study makes the magnitudes not
directly comparable with mine.
1.3.3 Reconciling the IV and OLS estimates
The OLS and IV results presented so far differ markedly in magnitude, which bears inves-
tigating. It seems unlikely that a local average treatment effect is inducing such substantial
heterogeneity in responses. It is also difficult to think of an omitted variable that is more
correlated with the instruments than the raw employment numbers leading to results of such
magnitude.
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If the Bartik-style construction of predicted employment is weakly correlated with ac-
tual employment, then the instrumental variables estimators can be very inconsistent. As
documented in Bound et al. (1995), the IV estimates are biased in the direction of OLS in
finite samples if the instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction. If the instruments do not
fully satisfy the exclusion restriction, the degree and direction of inconsistency depends on
the correlation between the instruments and the error term in the “structural” equation. It
cannot be tested directly if the composition of industries within a municipality is correlated
with an omitted variable that also affects fertility, but it is difficult to argue that the mea-
sure of predicted employment used here leads to a more inconsistent estimator than actual
employment in establishing demand shocks. In that sense, the reduced form results can be
construed as a bound on the results. Moreover, if the instruments do not satisfy the exclu-
sion restriction, then they are likely to be biased in the same direction. Yet the estimated
coefficients on male employment become much more positive and the estimated coefficients
on female employment become much more negative.
The most plausible explanation for the discrepancy in magnitudes appears to be mea-
surement error in the employment data. Although these data are at the administrative level,
they only comprise the formal sector. Firms, especially smaller ones, can move into and out
of the formal sector in Mexico. Some component of what may appear to be job gains or losses
can simply be the result of how firms choose to classify themselves. It is well-known that
panel data methods amplify the effects of measurement error. The higher the correlation
between employment levels in adjacent time periods, the more inconsistent the fixed-effects
estimator of the effects of employment is likely to be.
To investigate this more formally, consider a stripped-down first-differenced version of
equation (9) regressing changes in fertility on changes in log employment:
4ym,t = β4Empm,t +4εm,t
It follows that
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plim βˆ = β − βσ2v
(1−ρ)σ2emp+σ2v
where σ2v is the variance of the measurement error (for a derivation of this type of measure-
ment error, see Cameron and Trivedi, 2009) and ρ is the correlation between employment
in adjacent time periods. The correlation between the logarithm of employment in adjacent
years is close to one for some pairs of years. The equation above shows that such high serial
correlation leads to a strong attenuation bias for the estimated coefficient on employment.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation using the fixed effects estimates and the IV estimates
in Table 4 and the variance in employment in adjacent time periods in the data (9.24)
leads to an estimated variance in measurement error of 0.54. Even though the measurement
error described here is not exactly classical, the back-of-the-envelope calculation appears
reasonable given the magnitude of the variance in reported employment and how firms are
classified, and it is consistent with the instrumental variables estimates increasing by such
large magnitudes.
1.3.4 An approach robust to weak instruments
In this section I propose an alternative set of results that is robust to potentially weak
instruments. As noted previously, the large difference in magnitudes between the OLS and
IV estimators is unlikely to be due to weak instruments. However, the values of the Kleiber-
gen Paap Wald F statistic, especially for the estimates using all formal sector employment
separately for men and women, may be a concern. A traditional rule of thumb from Staiger
and Stock (1997) rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments if the first stage F statistic is
above 10. That rule of thumb was revised in Stock and Yogo (2005), who formalize the
arguments in Staiger and Stock (1997) and provide two criteria for establishing the presence
of weak instruments. First, an instrument can be construed as weak if the relative bias of
the IV estimator exceeds some level (say 10%) of the bias in the OLS estimator (bias test),
and second, an instrument can be thought of as weak if the size of the Wald test exceeds
a particular threshold (size test). Stock and Yogo suggest a test statistic that is equivalent
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to the first stage F statistic (if there is one endogenous regressor) or to the Cragg-Donald F
statistic (if there is more than one endogenous regressor) and provide critical values for the
F statistic based on the number of endogenous regressors and instruments, the maximum
bias allowed (if using the bias test), and the estimation method used.
However, the critical values provided by Stock and Yogo crucially depend on the as-
sumption of conditional homoscedasticity. In models containing heteroscedasticity, serial
correlation, or clustering, as is the case in this paper, the critical values are no longer valid.
Instead, I follow Kleibergen and Paap (2006), who suggest an F statistic that is robust to
the presence of non-independent and identically distributed standard errors. To the best of
my knowledge, however, the econometrics literature has not generated a formal test for the
presence of weak instruments when errors are not i.i.d. and there are multiple endogenous
regressors (see Montiel Olea and Pflueger, 2013, for a recent contribution when there is only
one endogenous regressor).
An alternative to testing for weak instruments involves the construction of confidence
sets that are robust to weak instruments; this approach exploits a duality to hypothesis
testing. Given a test of β = β0, one can create a confidence set for all values of β0 for which
the hypothesis is not rejected. Several tests have been proposed, including the conditional
likelihood-ratio test (Moreira, 2003), the Lagrange multiplier test (Kleibergen, 2002; Moreira,
2002), and the Anderson-Rubin test (Anderson and Rubin, 1949). I present results from the
latter because, unlike many of the other tests, it is generalizable to the case of more than
one endogenous regressor, uses standard F critical values, and is regression-based, making
the implementation straightforward.
Analysis using formal sector employment separated by gender has the smallest values of
the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. This is likely due to the non-tradable sector being
included in employment measures, as well as collinearity between male and female measures
of employment. Thus, I redo the instrumental variables analysis in Table 6 (that is, of
equation 9) by inverting the Anderson-Rubin test to create confidence sets for coefficients
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on men’s and women’s employment (see Baum et al., 2007).22 The Anderson-Rubin test
jointly tests β = β0 and the exogeneity of the instruments. That is, rejection would occur
if the null hypothesis is false or if the instruments are endogenous. The construction of the
confidence set is done via grid testing. Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the resulting confidence
sets (i.e. coefficients within the acceptance region), as well as the rejection surface, for the
effect of employment on general fertility rates. It makes little difference whether population is
controlled for via a linear, quadratic, or cubic polynomial. Consistent with the earlier results
assuming identification, positive (negative) shocks to employment for men lead to positive
(negative) changes in fertility rates; that is, for any potential effect of female employment,
the effect of male employment is positive. On the other hand, both positive and negative
effects are consistent with female employment, although the bulk of the confidence set falls
within negative parameter values for female employment.
1.4 Timing of births and effects on permanent fertility
1.4.1 Birth order and lagged effects
Fertility choice is a dynamic process. In theory, it is possible for changes in wages and
employment probabilities to affect total fertility, the timing of births, or both. I do not follow
cohorts of women over time and observe how their fertility responds to exogenous fluctuations
in employment opportunities. Instead, my data tie yearly birth records to employment data,
so I cannot address directly the question of how long-lasting any effects from yearly variations
in employment conditions may be. However, I can exploit additional information in birth
certificates to indicate whether couples are substituting across years, and whether differential
effects across the life-cycle are present.
In Table 7, I show results on fertility rates that separately consider only first births, second
births, and births of third or higher parity.23 IV results focusing only on manufacturing
22 The procedure is implemented using the command weakiv in Stata provided by Findlay et al. (2013).
23 I divide the total number of births in each parity group by the population of women aged 15-44.
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employment indicate that only births of third or higher order have a statistically significant
response to changes in employment for men. IV results using the full set of formal sector
employment show progressively larger impacts for men and women for higher parities. If
couples were timing births earlier in response to increased male employment, then we might
expect women with no previous births to increase fertility, but both sets of results indicate
that women with no previous births are the least responsive to changes in employment.
Instead, these results are consistent with exogenous shocks to male employment leading to
permanent increases in the size of families.
To further investigate whether the results here indicate changes in timing or total effects
on fertility, I augment Equation (9) with a one year, two year, and three year lag in male
and female employment. Table 8 focuses on the reduced form results using all formal sector
employment, with each column introducing an additional lag.24 Including lags of male and
female employment substantially increases the magnitude of both current-year coefficients,
implying that a 10% positive shock to the men’s labor demand index increases fertility rates
by slightly over 3%. The coefficent on predicted female employment becomes negative and
statistically significant from zero once a set of three lags is included, implying a 2% decreases
in fertility rates from a 10% positive shock to the women’s labor demand index. The net
effect for women (the sum of the lags), however, is close to zero and statistically insignificant
from zero.
These estimates provide evidence in favor of two points. First, current-period labor
market structure has the biggest impact on fertility decisions. This may be due to liquidity
constraints that prevent individuals from optimizing across years, to uncertain expectations
about future earnings, or simply the salience (in behavioral terms) of current conditions.
Second, substitution effects appear strongest in the current period for women, which is in
line with theory: a short-run negative shock to employment for women may reduce the
24 The sample size shrinks with every additional lag. Results are very similar if restricting to a consistent set
of years across column. I only show reduced form results, not IV, because all specifications are restricted to
contain at most two instruments to avoid multicollinearity problems with multiple instruments. Additional
lags are not statistically significant from zero.
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opportunity costs of having a child, while a short-run positive shock to employment may
induce some women to postpone fertility.
A caveat to these results is that coefficients from finite distributed lag models can be
unstable in the presence of serial correlation. Moreover, results from aggregated birth data
across years do not capture the same effect as following the same women over time and
studying lagged employment shocks for a given cohort. The next subsection turns to the
cyclical composition of employment shocks to disentangle effects on the timing of births from
effects on total fertility.
1.4.2 Time series properties of employment
It is important to understand the nature of formal sector employment shocks to interpret
whether these shocks have permanent or transitory effects. The results in the previous
subsection indicate that the largest impacts are on highest-order births, providing evidence
in favor of permanent effects. Those results are also consistent with the results in Heckman
and Walker (1990), who find that the majority of the effect of men’s incomes and women’s
wages on total fertility in Sweden is driven by the decision to have a third birth.
To gain a better understanding of the time series properties of employment for men
and women and explore the effect of employment dynamics, I follow the methodology in
Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger (1999), who filter the minimum wage to study how high-
and low-frequency cycles in the minimum wage affect the employment-to-population ratio.




(Empm,g,t − Empm,g,t−1) + 1
2
(Empm,g,t + Empm,g,t−1). (1.3)
The first term in parentheses focuses on sharp, high-frequency changes between years to
employment, whereas the second term in parentheses, a moving average, emphasizes slower-
moving cycles in employment.
When decomposing employment into higher- and lower-frequency components, I find that
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the overwhelming majority—over 90%—of the variation in the employment measures comes
from the lower-frequency component. Moreover, in a simple test of serial correlation (i.e. of
an AR(1) process), the coefficient in a regression of predicted employment for both men and
women on a lagged term of employment leads to a coefficient of about 0.7, which is statisti-
cally significant from zero at the 1% level in both cases. The evidence here, consistent with
the discussion in McNown (2003) on time series studies of the relationship between fertility
and economic variables, is that employment shocks are highly persistent. An implication
of the variance decomposition is that the results in Table 6 are driven by low-frequency
employment variation.
To separate the effects of slow-moving versus fast-moving variation in employment, I
show results using the filter in Equation (10) for the log of predicted employment in Table
9. As implied by the variance decomposition, the coefficients on predicted employment
(Column 6 in Table 6) in the earlier results are close in magnitude to the coefficients on
the low-frequency components in men’s and women’s predicted employment in Table 9.
This means that short-run fluctuations in employment are highly correlated over time, and
families presumably anticipate that a (negative) positive shock to labor market opportunities
today implies a (negative) positive shock to labor market opportunities in the future. This
is especially important in the case of fertility decisions, as both the pecuniary and time costs
of having children today accrue over a long time horizon.
The results in Table 9 indicate that cycles in employment for men at both high and low
frequencies increase fertility rates. For women, the effect is close to zero at the low frequency,
but becomes larger, negative, and statistically significant from zero (at the 10% level) at the
high frequency. The frequency domain sheds light on which components of employment—
that is, slow, secular changes, versus shocks associated with sharp responses to exogenous
shifts in demand—drive fertility decisions.
Because men’s employment generates income effects for the family, both low- and high-
frequency shifts in employment for men should have a positive impact on fertility, and indeed
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the results are consistent with the theory. When comparing the magnitude of the coefficient
on high-frequency men’s predicted employment to the coefficient on low-frequency men’s
predicted employment, I find that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients
are equal in magnitude. The impact of a low-frequency shock to men’s labor market oppor-
tunities, which a family may perceive as permanent income shock, may be expected to have
a greater impact on fertility than a high-frequency shock, which may appear to a family as
transitory. However, families may not be able to time births perfectly, may face liquidity con-
straints, or may not have perfect expectations about the future. Heckman and Walker (1990)
find that increases in men’s incomes reduce times to conception and raise total fertility, and
it appears that both effects are present here as well.
The decomposition of women’s predicted employment into high- and low-frequency com-
ponents allows us to reconcile the original results, which show no statistically significant
impact of increases in labor market opportunities on fertility, with the results of the dis-
tributed lag model, which indicate a negative impact in the short run but no meaningful
impact on total fertility over a longer time horizon. For women, it appears that fast-moving,
unexpected changes induce relatively larger substitution effects. Thus, transitory negative
shocks to employment opportunities, as indicated in the distributed lag models and in the
high-frequency component of employment, accelerate the the timing of births since the op-
portunity cost of having children declines during these labor market shocks. Over a longer
time period, permanent increases in income roughly offset the increased opportunity costs of
having children. These effects on fertility are masked in the earlier regression results, where
low-frequency variation dominates the employment measure.
1.5 How do changes in employment affect wages?
The results in this paper indicate that men’s employment has a robust, positive impact
on fertility, whereas women’s employment has weaker, negative impacts. In a wealthy coun-
try with high female labor force participation, we might expect that increases in women’s
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employment opportunities generate large income effects that may counteract substitution
effects from the increased opportunity cost of time, but this is unlikely to be the case in
Mexico. As theory implies that under certain conditions changes in employment may be
associated with changes in wages, I directly evaluate the relationship between employment
wages, wages, and sectoral gender intensity in this section.
First, changes in relative employment opportunities for women may increase their bar-
gaining power. Research indicates that men have higher fertility preferences than women
(Westoff and Bankole, 2002), so if increases in relative labor market opportunities for women
lead to shifts in favor of their preferences, we should also expect to see declines in fertility.
Although direct changes in wages and employment status can bring about a change in per-
sonal bargaining power, women who observe no change in job status or quality (that is,
those women who are unaffected on the extensive margin studied in this paper) may still see
enhanced bargaining power when their labor market opportunities improve: what matters is
their outside option. These inframarginal changes work in the same direction as changes on
the margin, so it seems puzzling that results are relatively weak for women’s employment.
Do positive shocks to women’s employment increase their earnings? To address this
question, I evaluate how changes in labor markets in Mexico affect earnings. Since the
instruments constructed in this paper exploit compositional differences across sectors, I focus
my analysis on differences among sectors. As a starting point, I calculate mean earnings for
men and women in each 4-digit sector in the IMSS data and plot the ratio of mean earnings
for men to mean earnings for women against the proportion of men in each sector, along
with the line of best fit, in Figure 7. The relative size of each circle indicates the number
of individuals in each sector. The graph suggests that sectors with relatively more men
have less gender-related earnings inequality. I evaluate this claim by regressing the ratio of
earnings on the proportion of men in each sector. Table 10 shows that the relationship is
strongly negative when pooling all years and comparing across sectors (column 1).
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Some authors have argued that sectors that employ mainly women pay lower wages.25
When I separately estimate how the proportion of men in each sector is correlated with
earnings for men and women, however, I find that women’s earnings have a small, albeit
positive, correlation with how male-dominated the sector is (column 2). It does not seem to
be the case that women working in female-centric industries are earning substantially lower
earnings. Men’s earnings, on the other hand, are strongly negatively correlated with how
many men there are in the sector (column 3).
Suppose, for simplicity, that there are two types of jobs within each sector: a high-paying,
high-skill type and a low-paying, low-skill type. If men work in both types of jobs, while
women are only employed in the latter, then sectors with few men should have disproportion-
ately more men in the high-paying sectors, leading to the type of wage inequality observed
in the IMSS data. Alternately, it is possible that both women and men are distributed in
high-skill jobs, but women earn lower relative wages in higher-paying occupations. To inves-
tigate these possibilities, I turn to the ENOE, a labor force survey in Mexico similar to the
CPS in the U.S., to study the relationship between wages, gender composition of industries,
and skill intensity.26 Columns 4-6 in Table 10 reproduce the same results as in the IMSS
data: wage inequality is negatively correlated with the proportion of men in each sector, and
this is mainly due to men earning less on average in sectors with more men.
Table 11 shows results for regressions of either wage inequality, log of male wages, or
log of female wages in each sector against the proportion of men in each sector and the
proportion of each gender in high-skill occupations. I define individuals as being in high-skill
occupations if they are employed as professionals or managers, which are the two highest
paid occupational classifications.27 Once the proportion of men and women in high-paying
25 For an extensive discussion of forces shaping gender differences in employment in developing countries,
see the World Bank Development Report (2011).
26 The ENOE contains a different classification of industries from the IMSS and consists of a smaller sample,
so the results are not directly comparable. I limit the analysis to those sectors with at least 10 individuals
of each gender in all years. Varying the cell size limit slightly does not affect the results qualitatively.
27 The other choices in the survey are as follows: educational workers, clerks, industrial workers, merchants,
transport operators, workers in personal services, protection and surveillance workers, and farmworkers.
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jobs is accounted for, the degree of male bias in each sector’s workforce ceases to predict
either wage inequality or wages for men or women.
To exploit differences across time and space in male versus female specialization, I return
to equation (9) and use the IMSS data to evaluate how employment for men and women
affects their earnings. Table 12 shows the impact of raw employment itself and the reduced
form. Earnings for both men and women are positively correlated with expansions in male
employment and negatively correlated with expansions in female employment. The predicted
demand measure, which isolates purely demand factors, shows even larger impacts for women,
with an elasticity of 0.19 for men’s demand shocks and -0.21 for women’s demand shocks.
Men’s earnings are unaffected by changes in demand for male or female labor. If all jobs were
identical, a positive shock to demand would be expected to raise wages, but because women
occupy lower wage positions, positive shocks to their demand actually lower their wages,
conditional on men’s demand shocks. In other words, separate demand shocks for women
and men likely lead to compositional changes in the labor force. For instance, if low-skill
women are induced into the labor force through positive shocks while high-skill women’s
labor market opportunities remain unaffected, then average female wages may decline, even
though wages for all women have weakly increased.
The difference in results for men’s wages when focusing on supply and demand shocks ver-
sus demand shocks only can be reconciled if male supply is increasing more among educated
groups, yet demand is more pronounced in lower-wage positions. This is consistent with
the results in Campos-Va´zquez (2013), who evaluates trends in wage inequality in Mexico
following the passage of NAFTA. He finds that the supply of college-educated workers has
grown rapidly, but high-skill occupations have not expanded enough to fill the new demand
for these positions, leading to wage compression at the top.
Even if positive demand shocks for men do not translate into higher wages among formal
sector jobs, formal sector jobs provide substantial health, social security, and childcare bene-
fits that are not available in the informal sector. Second, increased labor force participation
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on the extensive margin translates into pure income effects. Thus, regardless of the effect
on wages within the formal sector, increases (decreases) in male employment should lead to
higher (lower) fertility, which is consistent with the results in this paper.
1.6 The impact of maquiladora employment on fertility
1.6.1 Context behind the expansion of maquiladoras
The previous section established how changes in men’s and women’s formal employment
impact fertility decisions. In this section, I describe the history and context behind a par-
ticular type of formal sector employment in Mexico’s export-assembly plants, introduce a
different dataset and estimation strategy, and show results consistent with the earlier set of
findings.
After the termination of an agreement in which Mexico sent seasonal farm laborers to the
U.S., Mexico faced the prospect of a large pool of unemployed people living in the north.28
To generate incentives for firms to locate in the northern border region, in 1965 the Mexican
government introduced a plan called the Border Industrialization Program, which allowed
full foreign ownership of establishments in Mexico. Although these establishments, called
maquiladoras, were highly regulated initially, over time these regulations were relaxed to
attract more foreign investment.29
In particular, Mexico’s poor economic performance in the 1980s led to a series of eco-
nomic reforms and the liberalization of trade conditions, which led to large-scale growth in
maquiladora employment starting with the late 1980s. Figure 9 shows the growth of em-
ployment for each gender over the time period studied. Although aggregate employment for
men and women closely tracked each other, the graph masks how gender-segmented facto-
28 This was known as the Bracero Program. The combination of demand for low-wage agricultural workers
in the U.S and excess supply of labor in Mexico allowed the program to operate until 1964, when pressure
from U.S. labor unions led to the termination of the program.
29 For instance, maquiladoras were required to be within twenty kilometers of the border and all output
had to be exported. The bulk of employment has stayed near the border, however, as shown in Figure 8.
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ries are: for instance, factories specializing in textiles employ mainly women, while factories
manufacturing electronics employ mainly men. This segmentation applies not only at the
establishment-level, but also at the regional level, as shown in Figure 10, which illustrates
the average female share of maquiladora employment across Mexican municipalities.
1.6.2 How maquiladoras affect fertility
The growth in maquiladora line-employment happened at both the extensive and inten-
sive level: new plants opened, and plants that continued to operate increased in size. Figure
11 shows the density of employment at the establishment-level in 1990, 2000, and 2006. Al-
though there is a clear clear shift toward bigger sizes over time, typical sizes of maquiladoras
remained small, with median employment below 100 people.
To study the impact of the rapid growth in employment for both men and women across
sectors and regions on fertility decisions, I focus on establishment-level changes in employ-
ment from 1990-2006. I instrument for net new jobs for women (men) in export assembly
plants within each municipality with net new jobs for women (men) in these plants that are
solely due to large single-firm expansions/openings and contractions/closings (i.e. a change
of least 50 individuals in a given year). As Figure 11 indicates, maquiladoras are quite small,
so these are large changes relative to the size of the establishment.30
For the exclusion restriction to hold, I require that firms do not respond to fertility
decisions (or to any omitted determinant of fertility) with large expansions or contractions,
conditional on the fixed effects and controls for population in the estimating equation. This
seems especially plausible in my context, as I focus only on maquiladoras. It is likely that
large changes in employment at these plants involve high fixed costs and are due to shocks
in external demand from other countries (Atkin, 2012).
I create the employment variables as follows. I aggregate male and female employment
separately across all establishments within a municipality to create the main independent
30 Similar identification approaches have been employed by Atkin (2012) and Ananat et al. (2011).
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variable for each gender.31 To standardize the variable, I divide employment by the 1990
population of working-age men or women.32 I use the 1990 baseline year in the data for two
reasons: the main one is that the denominator may vary along with other conditions in the
municipality, and since maquiladora employment is very small relative to all employment
in most places, this can lead to a severe bias in the variable. (For instance, if maquiladora
employment increases for men, but population shifts lead to a large enough increase in
the denominator, then the term may decrease even when maquiladora employment goes
up.) Second, I interpolate the population between census years, which may introduce an
additional source of bias. Hence, using the 1990 population creates a standardized measure
to track how changes in maquiladora employment for each gender relative to the baseline
population of that gender affect fertility and marriage outcomes.
To construct the instrumental variable, I first difference employment for each gender at
each establishment across years. Keeping only the sample of establishments that contains
a change of at least 50 individuals from the previous year, I then aggregate employment to
the municipality level. Finally, I standardize by the 1990 population of that group, as with
the main independent variable.
Table 13 shows the first stage results for the full sample of municipalities in columns 1 and
2. Since a large proportion of municipalities has only one or two small factories, which are
unlikely to have a large impact on fertility if the population is large, I also limit the sample
to those municipalities that have at least 1% employment of either gender in at least one
year, which I call the restricted sample.33 The results for this sample are in columns 3 and
4. In all cases, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic is above 50, and both the instruments
31 I calculate average yearly employment from the monthly observations. Establishments can enter or exit
the data in any month, and some establishments do not contain data for some months between entry and exit
(i.e. due to temporary shut-downs or not answering the survey, which was required). For the set of plants
missing months, I tried three techniques: calculating average yearly employment only for those months in
the data, imputing employment based on previous months, or simply imputing zero. Results are similar for
all approaches.
32 The denominator is the population of men or women aged 15-44 in that municipality, linearly interpolated
from the decennial census.
33 Results are similar if restricting to 3% or 5% employment, although the sample size is substantially
reduced.
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for male and female employment are strongly correlated with actual employment.
Table 14 shows the OLS, IV, and reduced form results for the full sample, as well as
the restricted sample. The reduced form results indicate that men’s employment has a
large, positive impact on fertility, while the impact of women’s employment is negative,
albeit imprecisely estimated. The results imply that if, say, expansions or openings of new
maquiladoras lead to an additional 5% of the population to work in maquiladoras, this would
translate into a 0.01 increase in the log of the fertility rate. Although this may seem small,
it is important to keep in mind that maquiladoras make up a small proportion of the labor
force in most municipalities.
1.7 Migration, robustness, and alternative specifications
1.7.1 Migration
If individuals migrate into or out of municipalities experiencing changes in labor markets,
then resulting changes in fertility may be due to changes in the composition of individuals
living there and not to actual changes in behavior. There are three types of migration that
may affect the results. The first type concerns local migration: individuals may live in one
municipality and work in another. Since I link aggregate employment to aggregate fertility
in the same municipality, we can think of some births in the data as being assigned to the
wrong municipality. If men and women are equally likely to commute to other municipalities
for work, this can lead to measurement error that should bias the estimators for both groups’
employment toward zero. If men are more likely to commute to different municipalities, as
seems likely the case in this setting (unfortunately, I cannot test this directly), then the male
estimator should be more attenuated. Since I find larger results for men rather than women,
it appears unlikely that this type of bias is driving the results.
A second type of migration concerns moves across the country. As Mexico has industri-
alized, individuals living in poor rural communities in the south have moved to the north
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to work in maquiladoras and related enterprises. Suppose some young women migrate to
the north to work in factories and then return home to their rural communities, which have
little formal sector employment, to have children. This should bias me in favor of finding a
larger negative impact of female employment, yet I find no statistically significant impact.
Another possibility concerns selective migration into municipalities that undergo demand
shocks. This type of migration can result from either population movements within Mexico,
or cross-country migration (such as Mexican migrants returning from the U.S.). To probe
this further, I re-run equation (9), except I exclude population controls from the right-hand
side and instead use them as the outcome variables. Instrumenting employment for men and
women with predicted employment, I find that labor demand shocks for men and women are
not associated with changes in population for either men or women (Table 15). Although
it is possible that in-migration of a selected sample is exactly balanced by out-migration,
these results suggest that migrants are not choosing municipalities based on labor demand
shocks, at least in the short run. This is reassuring: changes in raw employment are due to
shifts in supply and demand, whereas the Bartik-style instrument should be isolating only
changes in labor demand.
1.7.2 Robustness
This paper uses an instrument in the tradition of Bartik (1991) to isolate an exogenous
predictor of employment. To test whether the results hold using a traditional Bartik-style







The definition of the terms is the same as before, except the denominator in the fraction is
now equal to employment in municipality m for group g (men or women) in the baseline time
period. This instrument is often constructed in first-differenced form and used to predict
employment growth. Two municipalities with exactly the same industrial composition would
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have the same values of this measure (ignoring the subtraction of own-employment in paren-
theses), as they would be expected to have similar levels of growth or decline in employment;
in other words, it is invariant to the municipality’s population. However, including municipal
fixed effects means the Bartik instrument effectively isolates the same type of variation as
the instrument used in the paper, and results replicating Table 6 (shown in Table 16) using
the instrument are qualitatively similar, though formal sector estimates are slightly larger
in magnitude.
Finally, I replace linear state trends with state-by-year fixed effects and again reproduce
the main analysis in Table 17. Such a specification flexibly controls for any unobservable
shocks specific to states in any particular year. Of course, municipalities located close to
each other are more likely to have similar labor market structure and thus to face similar
types of labor market shocks. There is no reason to believe that identification based on
the remaining variation across municipalities leads to more consistent estimators, given that
state-by-year fixed effects may absorb “too much” labor market variation.34 In practice,
the choice of linear, quadratic, or state-by-year fixed effects matters little: for instance, if
including year fixed effects, municipality fixed effects, a cubic in log population for men
and women, and year-by-state fixed effects, the impact of male formal sector employment
decreases slightly from 0.32 to 0.30, and standard errors increase as well, but the results
for men remain statistically significant at the 5% level, and results for women remain small
and statistically insignificant. It does not appear that nonlinear, unobservable deviations
correlated with labor market changes within states are driving the earlier results using all
formal sector employment. Specifications using only manufacturing employment result in
very similar estimated impacts for job opportunities for men, but standard errors increase
and the coefficients are statistically significant only at the 10% level.
34 An analogous point is made in Bound and Solon (1999), who show that identifying the returns to
schooling based on twin-comparisons may not lead to more consistent estimation.
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1.8 Conclusion
The question of how labor market opportunities shape decisions about the family has
long interested economists. In some developed countries, fertility rates are arguably too
low, and policymakers have invested large sums in relaxing perceived constraints to having
children, such as providing flexible working arrangements for young mothers, daycare, or
simply lump sum payments. On the other hand, in many developing countries fertility rates
remain stubbornly high, making countries that have gone through a large transformation in
family structure potentially useful guides for their own experiences.
Mexico has experienced a dramatic fall in fertility, as well as a steady increase in labor
market opportunities for young women, driven in part by an expansion in trade-oriented
manufacturing jobs. In more recent years, sectors traditionally employing young women,
such as textile manufacturing, have become less competitive as production has shifted to
China and other Asian economies with lower labor costs. This paper evaluates how expan-
sions and contractions in employment that vary across municipalities in Mexico and over
time affect fertility. Because fertility and employment are joint household decisions, I focus
on aggregate changes in demand conditions for both men and women, using a measure of
predicted employment that exploits labor market segmentation by sex and the industrial
structure of each local labor market, to isolate exogenous demand shocks for each group.
The findings are robust to an alternative identification strategy based on the expansion and
contraction of maquiladoras during the 1990s and early 2000s.
That women’s employment does not appear to have a significant net effect on fertility
may indicate that other broader, long-run social changes play an even greater role in ex-
plaining variation in fertility rates across time and space. In particular, economists and
demographers have documented that increases in educational attainment or health (lead-
ing to a preference for child quality over quantity), urbanization, and better access to and
knowledge of contraceptives have all been associated with declines in fertility.35 By focusing
35 For a discussion of theories of the fertility transition, see Mason (1997) and Guinnane (2011) for the
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on annual fluctuations in employment within a single country over a relatively short period,
which arguably keeps these longer-horizon variables fixed, I am able to identify the causal
impact of shocks to labor market opportunities on fertility.
The findings in this paper show that employment dynamics for both men and women
matter: positive demand shocks to men’s labor lead to positive changes in fertility, and a
variance decomposition of employment into high- and low-frequency components provides
evidence that increases in men’s labor market opportunities in the formal sector lead to higher
total fertility. Transitory positive shocks to women’s labor, on the other hand, increase the
opportunity cost of having children and hence lead families to delay fertility. Evidence
from the low-frequency component in exogenous employment variation for women, as well
as distributed lag models, indicate that over a longer period the net impact on total fertility
is negligible.
perspectives of a demographer and an economist, respectively, and the references therein.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: Fertility rates across Mexico
Notes: The general fertility rate is calculated as the number of births per 1000 women aged
15-44. Data are calculated from Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography
natality and census statistics in 2010.
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Fertility rate
Notes: The general fertility rate is calculated as the number of births per 1000 women aged
15-44. Data are calculated from Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography
natality and census statistics.
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Men Women
Proportion of men and women in formal sector employment,
standardized by baseline year.







2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
year
Men Women
Proportion of men and women in manufacturing employment,
standardized by baseline year.
Manufacturing employment
Notes: Trends in formal sector employment, standardized by employment in the first year,
are shown. Employment data come from the Mexican Social Security Institute.
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Linear in Population Controls
Notes: Confidence set and rejection surface for the Anderson-Rubin test.
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Quadratic in Population Controls
Notes: Confidence set and rejection surface for the Anderson-Rubin test.
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Cubic in Population Controls
Notes: Confidence set and rejection surface for the Anderson-Rubin test.
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Notes: The size of each circle represents the size of each sector. The line of best fit is
shown. Data are calculated from the Mexican Social Security Institute.
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Figure 1.8: Municipalities by maximal share of employment in maquiladoras
Notes: The share is calculated separately for men and women by taking aggregate
employment in maquiladoras and dividing by the estimated population of that group aged
15-44 in each year. Then the maximal share is calculated across all years in the dataset.
Data are calculated from the Maquiladora Export Industry Dataset, which is provided by
Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography.
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Trends in aggregate line employment for men and women at maquiladoras are shown. Data
are calculated from the Maquiladora Export Industry Dataset, which is provided by
Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography.
43
Figure 1.10: Municipalities by female share of maquiladora labor force
Notes: The share is calculated separately for each municipality. The “No data” category
refers to municipalities with no maquiladora exmployment. Data are calculated from the
Maquiladora Export Industry Dataset, which is provided by Mexico’s National Institute of
Statistics and Geography.
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Notes: The density of line employment at maquiladoras is shown for 1990, 2000, and 2006,
using the Epanechnikov kernel with the “optimal width” that minimizes mean integrated
squared error if the data were Gaussian.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: General fertility rates across Mexican federal entities
State Fertility rate in 2005 Fertility Rate in 2013
Aguascalientes 93 88
Baja California 89 77
Baja California Sur 94 71
Campeche 87 86


















Quintana Roo 91 76









General fertility rates are calculated as the sum of all births per 1000 women of ages 15-44
in each federal entity. The denominator is linearly interpolated from decennial census data
from INEGI.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics
Mean SD
General fertility rate 89.59 18.45
Formal sector employment 59645 84827
Male formal sector employment 23309 34252
Female formal sector employment 36336 50799
Male manufacturing employment 12332 19789
Female manufacturing employment 7139 13634
Female earnings 171.62 50.68
Male earnings 212.32 62.82
Female population (15-44) 115411 118753
Male population (15-44) 108985 113540
GFR - 1st births only 39.57 9.45
GFR - 2nd births only 24.97 4.87
GFR - 3rd births and above 25.03 10.38
Observations 9,108
Municipalities 1,012
Summary statistics are shown across years 2005-2013, weighted by population of women
aged 15-44 in each municipality. Author’s calculations from Mexico’s National Institute of
Statistics and Geography data.
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Table 1.3: Estimation of the relationship between employment and fertility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Male emp. 0.033*** 0.032***
(0.014) (0.014)
Fem. emp. -0.0096 -0.00048
(0.013) (0.016)
Male manuf. emp. 0.022** 0.022**
(0.0088) (0.0099)
Fem. manuf. emp. -0.0055 -0.0037
(0.0063) (0.0073)
Male inf. emp. -0.00073 -0.0012
(0.0047) (0.0047)
Fem. inf. emp. -0.0045 -0.0045
(0.0039) (0.0039)
Observations 9,108 9,108 9,108 9,108 5,630 5,630
Municipalities 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012 811 811
State trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pop Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses. The
dependent variable is the log of the fertility rate [number of children per 1000 women of
childbearing age]. Main independent variables are formal sector employment, male and
female formal sector employment, manufacturing employment, male and female
manufacturing employment, and male and female informal sector employment (all in logs).
Regressions are weighted by population of women aged 15-44, and results are for years
2005-2013. Cubic polynomials of the log population of men and women aged 15-44 are
included as controls.
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Table 1.4: First stage and OLS, IV, and RF of impact of employment on fertility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1st stage OLS IV RF
Log (pred. employment) 0.85*** 0.13***
(0.091) (0.033)
Log (all employment) 0.031*** 0.16***
(0.010) (0.042)
Observations 9,108 9,108 9,108 9,108
Municipalities 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012
State trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pop Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 87.5
The first stage for the log of employment is shown in the first column. OLS, instrumented
results (using log of employment as IV), and the reduced form are shown in remaining
columns, where the dependent variable is the log of the fertility rate. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is
the log of formal sector employment. Regressions are weighted by population of women
aged 15-44, and results are for years 2005-2013. Cubic polynomials of the log population of
men and women aged 15-44 are included as controls.
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Table 1.5: First stage regressions for men’s and women’s employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First stages
Men Women Men (manuf) Women (manuf)
Log (pred. 0.45** -0.13
male emp.) (0.14) (0.11)
Log (pred. 0.30** 1.14***
female emp.) (0.10) (0.11)
Log (pred. manuf 0.54*** -0.11
male emp.) (0.15) (0.18)
Log (pred. manuf 0.21 1.18***
female emp.) (0.13) (0.16)
Observations 9,108 9,108 9,108 9,108
Municipalities 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012
State trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pop Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage regressions for the log of male and female employment (columns 1 and 2) and
the log of male and female manufacturing employment (columns 3 and 4) using the
predicted measure of employment described in the text are shown. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted
by population of women aged 15-44, and results are for years 2005-2013. Cubic
polynomials of the log population of men and women aged 15-44 are included as controls.
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Table 1.6: Impact of male and female employment on fertility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV RF OLS IV RF
Men (all) 0.0328** 0.32**
(0.0139) (0.13)
Women (all) -0.00105 -0.087
(0.0129) (0.079)
Predicted men (all) 0.15**
(0.061)
Predicted women (all) -0.0055
(0.053)
Men (manuf) 0.0189** 0.20**
(0.00854) (0.089)
Women (manuf) -0.00522 -0.060
(0.00606) (0.052)
Pr. men (manuf) 0.12**
(0.047)
Pr. women (manuf) -0.027
(0.043)
Observations 9,108 9,108 9,108 9,108 9,108 9,108
Municipalities 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012
State trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pop Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap Wald 10.0 13.7
F statistic
OLS, IV, and reduced form regressions shown. The first three columns include all formal
sector employment in logs, while the next set of columns only includes formal sector
manufacturing employment in logs. The dependent variable in all cases is the log of the
general fertility rate. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported
in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by population of women aged 15-44, and results
are for years 2005-2013. Cubic polynomials of the log population of men and women aged
15-44 are included as controls.
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Table 1.7: Impacts on fertility rates by birth order
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
1st birth 1st birth 2nd birth 2nd birth 3rd+ birth 3rd+ birth
Men 0.014 0.059 0.073*** 0.62*** 0.055* 0.83***
(0.026) (0.20) (0.025) (0.22) (0.028) (0.27)
Women 0.027 0.044 -0.021 -0.31** -0.034 -0.35**
(0.022) (0.12) (0.021) (0.12) (0.026) (0.15)
Observations 9,108 9,108 9,108 9,108 9,105 9,105
Municipalities 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012
State trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pop Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KP Wald F stat 10.0 10.0 10.0
OLS, IV, and reduced form regressions of fertility rates by parity on the log of predicted
employment for men and women are shown. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level and reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by population of
women aged 15-44, and results are for years 2005-2013. Cubic polynomials of the log
population of men and women aged 15-44 are included as controls.
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Table 1.8: Impact of current and lagged predicted employment on fertility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GFR GFR GFR GFR
Pred. male employment 0.15** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.39***
(0.061) (0.098) (0.10) (0.11)
Pred. female employment -0.0055 -0.17 -0.15 -0.20**
(0.053) (0.11) (0.096) (0.100)
Pred. male employment -0.14 -0.0017 -0.11
Lag one (0.093) (0.16) (0.17)
Pred. female employment 0.16* 0.21 0.20**
Lag one (0.094) (0.14) (0.10)
Pred. male employment -0.15 0.074
Lag two (0.11) (0.14)
Pred. female employment -0.0064 -0.055
Lag two (0.11) (0.12)
Pred. male employment -0.11
Lag three (0.086)
Pred. female employment 0.062
Lag three (0.098)
Sum of lags for men 0.15** 0.18*** 0.16** 0.24**
(0.061) (0.067) (0.072) (0.098)
Sum of lags for women -0.0055 -0.0033 0.051 0.09
(0.053) (0.057) (0.061) (0.068)
Observations 9,108 8,096 7,084 6,072
Number of municipalities 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012
State trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pop Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table shows results of regressions of the log of the fertility rate on the log of predicted
formal sector employment (i.e. the reduced form) for men and women and their lags.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses.
Regressions are weighted by population of women aged 15-44, and results are for years
2005-2013. Cubic polynomials of the log population of men and women aged 15-44 are
included as controls.
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High-frequency men’s employment 0.42**
(0.18)
High-frequency women’s employment -0.29*
(0.17)
Low-frequency men’s employment 0.14***
(0.058)
Low-frequency women’s employment -0.0033
(0.057)
Observations 8,096





This table shows results of regressions of the log of the fertility rate on the decomposition
of the log of predicted employment for men and women into high and low frequencies.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses.
Regressions are weighted by population of women aged 15-44, and results are for years
2006-2013. Cubic polynomials of the log population of men and women aged 15-44 are
included as controls.
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Table 1.10: Relationship between gender intensity of sector and wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IMSS IMSS IMSS ENOE ENOE ENOE
Male-to-female Female Male Male-to-female Female Male
wage earnings earnings earnings wage ratio wage wage
Proportion male -0.42*** 0.093 -0.27*** -0.17*** -0.054 -0.20***
(0.042) (0.090) (0.088) (0.052) (0.075) (0.066)
Observations 2,206 2,206 2,206 640 640 640
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regressions of log wages and log earnings and the wage ratio on proportion of men in each
sector, weighted by employment in that sector. Each cell is a sector-year. The ENOE
regressions are limited to sectors with a cell size of 10 or greater.
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Regressions of either wage inequality, log of male wages, or log of female wages in each
sector against the proportion of men in each sector and the proportion of each gender in
high-skill occupations. Results are for years 2006-2013.
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Table 1.12: Impacts on earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Female Male Female
earnings earnings earnings earnings
Male employment 0.15*** 0.17***
(0.026) (0.022)
Female employment -0.070*** -0.10***
(0.017) (0.017)
Pred. male employment -0.015 0.19***
(0.068) (0.061)
Pred. female employment -0.060 -0.21***
(0.054) (0.051)
Observations 9,108 9,108 9,108 9,108
Number of municipalities 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012
State trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pop Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type OLS OLS RF RF
This table shows results of regressions of log earnings on the log of actual and predicted
employment (reduced form) for men and women. Results are for years 2005-2013.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
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Table 1.13: First stage regressions for maquiladora employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women Men Women
IVmen 0.901*** 0.356*** 0.855*** 0.330***
(0.0523) (0.0610) (0.0536) (0.0614)
IVwomen 0.212*** 0.744*** 0.190*** 0.709***
(0.0365) (0.0596) (0.0369) (0.0572)
Observations 38,441 38,441 4,496 4,496
R-squared 0.807 0.764 0.813 0.766
Number of municipalities 2,403 2,403 281 281
Linear state trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Restricted Restricted
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 57.06 57.06 51.64 51.64
This table shows results of first stage regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level and reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by population of
women aged 15-44, and results are for years 1991-2006. The dependent variables (men and
women) represent the total employment of that gender in the municipality divided by the
1990 population aged 15-44 of that gender. The IV represents replaces total employment
with total employment solely due to expansions, contractions, openings, and closings of
plants. Regressions contain fixed effects for municipality, year, and linear state trends.
Cubic polynomials of the log population of men and women aged 15-44 are included as
controls. Restricted sample contains only municipalities that have at least 1% employment
of men or women in maquiladoras at least one year.
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Table 1.14: OLS, IV, and reduced form results using maquiladora employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV RF OLS IV RF
GFR GFR GFR GFR GFR GFR
Men 0.107 0.259* 0.188 0.334**
(0.142) (0.146) (0.120) (0.134)
Women -0.0319 -0.154 -0.100 -0.215
(0.140) (0.148) (0.138) (0.155)
IV: men 0.178** 0.215***
(0.0896) (0.0691)
IV: women -0.0597 -0.0889
(0.0871) (0.0892)
Observations 38,441 38,441 38,441 4,496 4,496 4,496
Municipalities 2,403 2,403 2,403 281 281 281
Linear state trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap 57.06 51.64
Wald F statistic
Sample Full Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted
OLS, IV, and RF regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and
reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by population of women aged 15-44, and
results are for years 1991-2006. The independent variables (men and women) represent the
total employment of that gender in the municipality divided by the 1990 population aged
15-44 of that gender. Regressions contain fixed effects for municipality, year, and linear
state trends. The IV represents replaces total employment with total employment solely
due to expansions, contractions, openings, and closings of plants. Cubic polynomials of the
log population of men and women aged 15-44 are included as controls. Restricted sample
contains only municipalities that have at least 1% employment of men or women in at least
one year.
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Table 1.15: Impacts on population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
Men Men Women Women
Male employment (all) 0.023** -0.36 0.0073 -0.23
(0.011) (0.24) (0.011) (0.23)
Female employment (all) 0.034*** -0.065 0.046*** -0.14
(0.013) (0.16) (0.013) (0.16)
Observations 9,108 9,108 9,108 9,108
Number of municipalities 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012
State trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pop Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
OLS and IV regressions for the impact of log male and female employment on log
population are shown. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
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Table 1.16: Using a Bartik-style IV to identify the impact of employment on fertility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV RF OLS IV RF
Male emp. 0.0446*** 0.48**
(0.0143) (0.20)






Male manuf. emp. 0.0216** 0.22**
(0.00885) (0.099)






Observations 9,108 6,129 6,129 9,108 9,108 9,108
Number of municipalities 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012
State trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pop Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap Wald 6.24 10.9
F statistic
OLS, IV, and reduced form regressions shown. The first three columns include all formal
sector employment, while the next set of columns only includes formal sector
manufacturing employment. The dependent variable in all cases is the log of the general
fertility rate. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in
parentheses. Regressions are weighted by population of women aged 15-44, and results are
for years 2005-2013.
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Table 1.17: Impact of male and female employment on fertility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)









Men (ma.) 0.0166** 0.18*
(0.00821) (0.096)
Women (ma.) -0.00667 -0.052
(0.00594) (0.051)
Pred. Men (ma.) 0.094**
(0.047)
Pred. Wo. (ma.) -0.026
(0.043)
Observations 9,108 9,108 9,108 9,108 9,108 9,108
Number of municipalities 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012
State-by-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pop Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap 9.52 10.3
Wald F statistic
OLS, IV, and reduced form regressions for the impact of male and female employment on
general fertility rates are shown. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level
and reported in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by population of women aged 15-44,
and results are for years 2005-2013. Regressions contain fixed effects for municipality, year,
and year by state interactions. Cubic polynomials of the log population of men and women
aged 15-44 are included as controls. Cubic polynomials of the log population of men and
women aged 15-44 are included as controls.
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CHAPTER II
The Impact of Relative Wages on Marriage
2.1 Introduction
Mexico has undergone major social changes in the last three decades. Trade liberaliza-
tion, starting in the 1980s, led to the decline of import-substituting sectors and accelerated
the growth of export-oriented sectors. Recent evidence indicates that these labor market
shocks have differentially affected men versus women (Juhn, Ujhelyi, and Villegas-Sanchez,
2014; Garcia-Cuellar, 2001; Artecona and Cunningham, 2002). Indeed, women’s labor force
participation rates have steadily increased over this period. At the same time, marriage rates
have declined, and rates of single motherhood have increased. Can changes in labor markets
explain some of the recent trends in family formation in Mexico?1
Despite these changes, Mexico continues to lag behind the U.S. and Europe in facilitating
women’s entry into the labor force, and recent research argues wage discrimination against
women, especially low-skilled women in the informal sector, remains common (Popli, 2013).
Furthermore, Mexico has a history of conservative gender norms, with the Catholic Church
playing a strong role in propagating traditional views of men and women. Notwithstanding
these differences in history, institutions, and stages of development, Mexico—and many other
1 This paper focuses exclusively on changes in marriage between men and women since 1990. A law
recognizing same-sex marriage was passed in 2009 and took effect in 2010 in Mexico City and in some other
jurisdictions thereafter (but remains prohibited in most localities, though it is required to be recognized
everywhere), which unfortunately precludes me from including it in the analysis. Henceforth, the term
“marriage” refers only to different-gender couples.
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middle-income countries in Latin America—has undergone trends that are similar to those
in the U.S. and Europe.
From a policy perspective, these issues matter because Mexico lacks the kinds of government-
provided social programs provided by wealthy countries. Instead, family-based social net-
works effectively function as a social safety net. On the one hand, religion, the lack of a
government safety net, and kin-based stigmatization may deter women from avoiding mar-
riage or having a child outside of marriage. On the other hand, social networks and extended
households can provide alternative sources of insurance (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007). The
literature on labor markets and marriage has not yet explored how the structural changes in
labor markets that have been observed over the last few decades interact with this difference
in norms in Mexico and many other developing countries. Other social and economic changes,
such as advancements in household technology (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu, 2005),
reductions in the costs of obtaining market substitutes for time-intensive commodities that
traditionally were produced at home (Sevilla-Sanz, 2005; Ilahi, 2000), declines in the influ-
ence of the Catholic Church, and evolving preferences regarding traditional gender norms,
have all played an important role in changing Mexicans’ views toward marriage.
This paper contributes to a growing literature in labor and family economics that studies
the causal effect of changes in labor market opportunities on changes in marriage and family
structure (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2017; Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan, 2015; Shenhav,
2016; Schaller, 2016; Kis-Katos, Pieters, and Sparrow, 2017). In particular, I find that the
rise in relative labor demand for women explains at least some of the decline in marriage
in Mexico. I also find, unlike recent work focusing on the U.S. (Shenhav, 2016), that these
effects are concentrated among higher-educated women. Concentrating on regional variation,
I find that urban, wealthier regions of the country have the greatest impacts.
A large literature has focused on how non-wage sources of income affect household bar-
gaining power in developing countries. For instance, Bobonis (2009) studies how an exoge-
nous increase in income for women changes expenditures; Ashraf, Karlan, and Ying (2010)
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implement a randomized control trial to study how a savings product changes decision-
making power within a household; and Duflo (2003) shows that an exogenous increase in
women’s income, via an old-age pension, changes intra-household spending patterns. Most
of this research has focused on bargaining within the household, taking marriage as given,
whereas I focus on the household formation decision. Moreover, finding sources of credible,
exogenous variation in relative labor demand has proven difficult. Yet, as Anderson and
Eswaran (2009) note, earned sources of income may play a much more important role than
unearned sources in leading to women’s empowerment.
Similar to Aizer (2010), I generate measures of local labor demand for men and women
that are based on exogenous demand shocks using a shift-share approach (Bartik, 1991).
This is especially important in a setting like Mexico, where fewer than half of all women
work. Thus, observed wages are unlikely to serve as a reliable indicator of “potential” wages
for all women. Potential wages, not actual wages, determine bargaining power between men
and women at their threat point (Pollak, 2005).2
The results of this paper provide support for traditional models of the household, where
the man specializes in market work and the woman specializes in non-market work (Becker,
1973; Becker, 1981). Comparative advantage, then, leads to gains to marriage through
specialization. If women’s wages, relative to men’s, increase, then the gains to marriage
are diminished. To the extent that men and women may have different preferences about
whom they marry, when they marry, and the nature of marriage,3 the results here imply that
relative labor market opportunities (and not just unearned income) may also alter bargaining
power.
Changes in bargaining power between men and women can have important social di-
2 The specification of the threat point depends on the model. In early bargaining models, it is specified as
divorce, that is, the payoff each individual receives if the marriage ends (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy
and Horney, 1981). In a less severe formulation, such as in Lundberg and Pollak (1993), the threat point
is a noncompetitive equilibrium within marriage where each individual retreats to his or her own “separate
sphere.” These models focus on bargaining within marriage. Prior to marriage, we can think of a threat
point as an outside option, such as staying single.
3 Pollak (2016) discusses the implications of models that assume whether individuals make binding agree-
ments in the marriage market versus models that allow for bargaining in marriage.
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mensions. Latin American countries, including Mexico, have among the highest rates of
domestic abuse and rates of violence against women in the world (Waiselfisz, 2015). In-
creases in labor market opportunities may reduce violence against women by improving
their outside option (Aizer, 2010)—that is, allowing them to decline marriage, or delay mar-
riage to search for higher-quality partners. Although I show that increases in relative labor
market opportunities for women lead to declines in marriage, I cannot conclude whether
these effects are welfare-improving.4 Declining marriage may lower consumption, increase
incidence of poverty, and deprive women of insurance against income shocks. Furthermore,
a broad literature has documented negative impacts on children from single motherhood,
such as drug use, risky sexual activity, and low test scores, implying that these effects may
persist through subsequent generations.5 Nevertheless, the effects documented in this paper
are concentrated mainly among higher-educated women, who command higher wages and
have access to greater resources to offset some of these negative effects.
2.2 Conceptual framework
Potential reasons for the decline in marriage include advancements in household technol-
ogy, changes in social norms and legal institutions, declines in the influence of Catholicism,
shortages of “marriageable men” (Edin and Nelson, 2013), and changes in relative labor
market opportunities. A broad literature has examined recent trends in marriage and expla-
nations for its decline (e.g. Lundberg and Pollak, 2014 and citations therein).6 This section
presents a simple conceptual framework for describing how a particular indicator of labor
4 Evidence from Angelucci (2008) suggests that when poor women in rural Mexico obtain higher non-wage
income, they receive less abuse from their husbands, which may be welfare-improving for women. Bobonis
et al. (2013) find that women who receive transfer benefits are less likely to be victims of physical abuse,
though other types of abuse increase. These results also provide an alternative mechanism for how wage or
income changes can reduce violence against women, given the potential non-pecuniary costs associated with
marriage.
5 See McLanahan, Tach, and Schneider (2013), McLanahan and Percheski (2008), Autor et al. (2016),
and Ayllo´n and Ferreira-Batista (2015). For evidence that children of less-skilled Hispanic mothers in the
U.S. are better off without fathers, see Finlay and Neumark (2010).
6 Most of this work focuses on the U.S. or Europe. To what extent these trends carry over to a middle-
income country like Mexico is a central issue in this paper.
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market opportunities—relative wages for women—affects decisions regarding marriage.
I describe two aspects of how relative wages influence a marriage market equilibrium:
first, the payoffs to marriage and how these payoffs influence how many individuals choose
to marry; and second, selection into marriage, that is, which individuals marry (Pollak,
2016). An individual marries if the utility of marriage exceeds the utility of being single:
U(Marry) > U(Single). I assume, as in Becker (1973), that one of the motivations for
marriage involves “production complementarities.” In Becker’s original (1973) formulation,
two individuals can generate income together or separately. The output from marriage is
the sum of what these individuals produce together. The gains to marriage are larger the
more they can produce together, relative to what they would produce on their own. This
occurs with economies of scale and when each partner specializes according to his or her
comparative advantage. Thus, if women have lower potential wages,7 men specialize in
market work, whereas women specialize in household production.8 As long as the latter
holds, the gains to marriage decrease as women’s wages, relative to men’s wages, increase.
Thus, the utility of marriage is decreasing in the relative wage: ∂U(Marry)
∂(wF−wM ) < 0.
A second component consists of how relative wage changes affect selection into marriage.
That the utility of marriage decreases if the relative wage increases does not imply that all
women are equally impacted by a rise in the relative wage. In particular, it is reasonable
to believe that the utility of being single is a function of one’s own potential wage as well
as other factors, such as the level of support one can expect from one’s family and social
network: U(Single) = f(wF ,ε). If wages or non-labor sources of income are low enough,
and hence U(Single) is low enough, then a decrease in the gains to marriage may not be
enough to deter marriage.9
7 Note that what matters here are potential wages, not actual wages. As I show later, women are positively
selected into the labor force, and actual wages for the subset of women who work are not substantially lower
than wages for men.
8 An alternative economic way of thinking about the gains to marriage is through consumption comple-
mentarities (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007), rather than through production complementarities.
9 More formally, this means that ∂Prob(Single)∂wF differs across women, depending on the value of each
individual’s draw of ε. If for some individuals U(Married) > U(Single) before and after a change in the
potential wage, then ∂Prob(Single)∂wF = 0.
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Despite its simplicity, several predictions emerge from this setup. An increase in the
relative wage for women decreases the likelihood of marriage. This occurs because an increase
in women’s wages reduces the gains to marriage, whereas an increase in men’s wages increases
the gains to marriage. Moreover, the effect of changes in the relative wage is likely to be
blunted among women with the lowest potential wages, as they may not be close to the
margin between choosing or foregoing marriage.
2.3 Data and background on wages and marriage
2.3.1 Data description
Data come from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 Mexican censuses.10 The main analysis focuses
on how changes in wages for women, relative to men, affect marriage decisions. Each census
uses a different industry classification (the 1990 census uses five-digit sectors, the 2000 census
uses three-digit sectors, and the 2010 census uses four-digit sectors). As the identification
strategy relies on industrial composition at the local level to identify impacts of relative labor
market opportunities on marriage, I need a consistent measure across time to link industries.
Hence, I created a concordance table to link industries, aggregating to the 3-digit level.
To exploit variation in local labor markets, I perform the analysis at the municipality-
level. Hence, each municipality represents a local labor market in this framework. Since the
number of municipalities has grown over time, I use consistent boundary definitions across
all years.
2.3.2 Wage gaps
Since this paper exploits changes in relative labor market opportunities due to exogenous
demand shocks, it is useful to consider the main sources of the gender wage gap as well as
10 Data are made available via the Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series,
International: Version 6.4 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 2015. I do not use earlier
years because an earthquake in Mexico City in 1985 destroyed the 1980 census information before it could
be digitized.
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potential reasons for how and why it has evolved. This subsection briefly reviews a few of
the findings from the study of wage gaps.
Research on U.S. labor markets has documented a sizeable wage gap between men and
women (Blau and Kahn, 2000; Blau and Kahn, 2006; Blau and Kahn, 2017), with women’s
relative wages increasing sharply in the 1980s. A large body of work has considered the roles
of selection (i.e. cohorts with different characteristics entering the labor force over time, as
in Mulligan and Rubenstein, 2008), gender discrimination, gender differences in employment
at the occupation-, industry-, and firm-level11, the impact of children (Waldfogel, 1998), the
level of competition in the market (Becker, 1957), and technological shifts (Blau and Kahn,
1997). These explanations are not mutually exclusive. For instance, women may anticipate
reducing labor supply in response to having children, which would lead them to lose general
or firm-specific capital. At the same time, they may opt for occupations and firms with
greater flexibility in working arrangements, even though these may offer lower returns.
Women’s wages increased sharply in the 1980s in the U.S., with evidence that positive
selection by women into the labor force helped to close the unconditional wage gap (Mulligan
and Rubinstein, 2008; Bar, Kim, and Leukhina, 2015). Studies of the gender wage gap over
time in Mexico have mainly focused on the impacts of trade liberalization.12 Formerly a
fairly inward-oriented economy, trade reforms began in 1985 in Mexico and culminated in
the signing of NAFTA in 1994. This period coincided with moderate increases in labor force
participation by women.
Aguayo-Tellez et al. (2010) argue that women’s relative wages increased in Mexico during
the period of trade liberalization, with both between- and within-industry shifts favoring
women. I find similar results. In particular, I evaluate changes in female intensity across
11 Women are often observed in lower-paying sectors and occupations. Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2016)
provide evidence that women are more likely to work in firms with smaller pay premiums.
12 An important caveat of these studies is that they usually focus on differences-in-differences estimates
before and after NAFTA, comparing the border region in Mexico, which is presumably more exposed to
trade effects, to other parts of the country. However, many trade reforms preceded NAFTA, and Mexico’s
economy was undergoing structural changes at the same time, so it is possible the effects of NAFTA are
conflated with other policy changes during this period.
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industries in my data and find that virtually all sectors had a higher female share in 2010,
compared to 1990 (see Figure 1). Garcia-Cuellar (2001), focusing on changes between high-
and low-skilled labor, finds a narrowing in the low-skilled gender wage gap that she argues
is associated with NAFTA. She argues that these results both confirm the predictions of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model because Mexico is abundant in low-skilled female labor, as well as
support Becker’s (1957) theory because less competitive sectors prior to NAFTA saw greater
decreases in the wage gap.
Perhaps surprisingly, given the consistency in international wage gaps in other research
(Blau and Kahn, 2003), the unconditional wage gap between men and women in Mexico is
small; depending on the way wages are defined, women may even earn more than men.13
Figure 2 shows average wage gaps (using different ways of constructing the sample) across the
three decennial censuses in 1990, 2000, and 2010 for both full-time workers and all workers.
Regardless of the manner in which wages are defined, there is a modest increase in relative
wages for women in the 1990s, which was followed by a more modest increase or relative
stagnation in the 2000s, depending on which measure of wages is used. Of course, given the
list of factors associated with the wage gap, these only provide descriptive evidence of the
evolution of unconditional wages.
For a closer look at the wage gap, I estimate Mincerian regressions of the natural log-
arithm of wages for men and women for each of the decennial censuses between 1990 and
2010.14 Column (1) in Tables 1, 2, and 3 (on data from 1990, 2000, and 2010, respectively)
shows the results of regressions that only contain a constant and a male dummy variable,
which is not statistically significant from zero in 1990 or 2000 and only marginally positive
and statistically significant at the 10% level in 2010. Columns (2) and (3) add extra controls
13 A similar pattern is documented in Aguayo-Tellez et al. (2010) when including self-employed workers,
which I also include in the analysis that follows. Popli (2013) also finds a small differential in raw wages for
men and women, whereas conditioning on observable characteristics increases the size of the wage gap. Note
that even though the unconditional wage gap is small in the census data, a sizable earnings gap is observed
since men work longer hours than women.
14 These results are only meant to describe wage differences and not to decompose formally the gap into
differences due to characteristics of men and women and to differences due to the rewards to these charac-
teristics. See Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) for a discussion of these methods.
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common in the literature decomposing wage gaps (schoolings, years of experience, years of
experience squared, marital status, industry, occupation). As more controls are added, the
wage gap grows. Notice, also, that being married is associated with earning higher wages,
with married women earning a more significant premium than married men. Since the wage
gap grows as more controls are added, women appear to be positively selected into the
labor force.15 Figure 3 supports this view: it shows the mean employment-to-population
ratio of women at each year of completed schooling. The relationship between the likeli-
hood of being employed and years of schooling is generally positive. Figures 5 and 6 show
mean employment-to-population rates across regions and education groups over time. These
graphs indicate consistent increases across all regions and over all skill-types over time, with
greater increases in the 1990s, which encompasses many trade reforms, than in the 2000s,
which coincides with a long period of stagnation in the Mexican economy.16
In sum, the pattern of wage differences between men and women in Mexico observed
over the last two decades is as follows: women are positively selected into employment, and
employment has increased across both high- and low-skill groups. Overall, the wage gap
decreased between 1990 and 2000, but has not narrowed markedly since 2000 due to changes
in both supply and demand factors.
2.3.3 Marriage in Mexico
Recent work by sociologists and scholars of Latin America describes women’s status
and marriage expectations in terms of patriarchy and marianismo17 giving way to more
egalitarian norms in recent times. However, Arrom (1985) argues women’s roles did not
follow this linear path; instead, she argues that in some ways women had greater autonomy
15 Note that this implies that that some combinations of controls may be less common among women than
among men and vice versa. N˜opo (2008) discusses how to use matching to deal with the lack of a common
support in the distribution of attributes among men and women when decomposing gender wage gaps.
16 Note that these patterns are functions of long-run trends as well as short-run shocks, as these decennial
censuses are not taken along the same points in the business cycle.
17 Marianismo is a term coined by Stevens (1973) as a counterpart to machismo to describe the ideal of
femininity in terms of Mary, mother of Jesus. The expectations of marianismo in marriage involve having
children and serving one’s husband.
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in the nineteenth century than in the first half of the twentieth century.18 She documents
high rates of households being headed by women in the nineteenth century, though much
of this was due to widowhood. Marriage was traditionally under control of the Catholic
Church, but liberal reformers in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America argued in favor
of civil marriage to secularize the institution (Sanders, 2012). Unfortunately, these reforms
eliminated equal treatment of the sexes in some conditions. Sanders (2012) provides adultery
as an example: Catholic doctrine treated adultery the same for both husbands and wives,
but subsequent reforms legalized adultery for husbands yet made it a crime for women.
Ultimately, twentieth-century laws have been updated to remove discrimination on the basis
of sex, and divorce was enshrined as a legal right in Mexico’s constitution of 1917, though
conservative local norms and traditions continue to stigmatize it.
Table 4 provides summary statistics showing changes in marriage rates between 1990,
2000, and 2010, and Figure 7 shows the proportion of women who are married by age
grouping. Marriage rates among women aged 16-21 have not declined, but marriage rates
among women aged 22 and above have steadily declined over these two decades, with the
biggest decline among women in their 20s. This is a combination of foregoing and delaying
marriage. At the same time, the median age of first marriage has increased over time from
twenty years in 1995 to twenty-seven in 2013 (INEGI, 1997; INEGI, 2013). Table 4 also
shows that Mexican women are more likely to be heads of households, to live in a household
with no children, to be single mothers, and to be divorced in 2010 than in 1990. To the
extent that these trends are manifestations of women’s increasing bargaining power over this
period, the next section focuses on addressing whether these changes are causally related to
changes in relative labor demand for women.
18 Arrom (1985) also notes that Mexico granted women greater property rights during this time than the
U.S.
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2.4 Identification of relative labor demand shocks for women
2.4.1 Relative bargaining power in the labor market
The principal problem with identifying the impact of relative bargaining power in the
labor market is obtaining a credible proxy for an individual’s bargaining power. I build on
two important insights in Pollak (2005). First, I use a proxy for labor demand to isolate
exogenous demand shocks for wages for men and women. I do not use not earnings or hours
worked to proxy for bargaining power. Higher earnings may simply signify working more
hours (and hence devoting less time to household production and leisure), but that does
not imply having more bargaining power relative to one’s spouse. Having a higher wage,
however, does indicate having more bargaining power in the labor market.
The second major point in Pollak (2005) is determining how to specify an individual’s
wage. In typical bargaining models, bargaining is determined by well-being at one’s “threat
point”, not at the observed equilibrium. For instance, a woman may choose not to work if
she marries, in which case her wages are not observed in equilibrium. Suppose that if she
were to remain single, however, she would work; this is her potential or outside wage option.
Own-wages cannot serve as a reliable proxy for relative bargaining power. Prevailing local
wages might serve as a better indicator of relative bargaining power in the labor market,
but these still suffer from being observed wages in equilibrium. In particular, when female
labor force participation is low and unrepresentative of working-age women, shocks to local
wages may reflect both supply and demand decisions of women. For instance, if a local area
experiences increases in labor force participation among less-skilled women, prevailing wages
may decrease, even though potential wages may have increased for these women.
To identify exogenous sources of variation in an individual’s potential wage, I create an
index for local labor demand following the methodology in Bartik (1991), Blanchard and
Katz (1992), and many subsequent papers. Katz and Murphy (1992) formalize this measure
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The measure of local labor demand is calculated for each gender g in each municipality m
in each year y by weighting industry-wide (log) employment for each gender g in each year
by the share of men or women employed in a given industry ind in that municipality and
then summing over all industries.20 Specifically, the numerator in θm,g,ind is equal to the
employment of group g in municipality m in industry ind in 1990, and the denominator
in the fraction is equal to the total employment of group g in municipality m in 1990.
This employment share does not vary across years to prevent endogenous responses in labor
supply from biasing the measure. Here, Emp−m,g,ind,y is the (log) employment in industry
ind. I also follow the common practice of excluding municipality m from the calculation
of Emp−m,g,ind,y to prevent local employment changes from influencing the measure; this is
indicated by −m. I take the difference between women’s labor market demand and men’s
labor market demand as my measure of relative bargaining power in the labor market.
2.4.2 Labor demand variation
Before moving on to the econometric specification and the results, it is useful to consider
what explains the variation in labor demand for women versus men. Similar to work studying
demand for skilled versus unskilled workers, we can think of men and women as being
imperfect substitutes in firms’ production functions. Over the time period studied here,
the proportion of the labor force that was female rose, which potentially reflects increasing
labor supply among women, increases in labor demand, or both. It is also important to
19 A similar discussion, as well as references, can be found in Katz and Autor (1999).
20 Bartik (1991) discusses the conceptual rationale for using weighted industry shares as a measure of the
local demand for labor.
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note that Mexico experienced within-industry shifts, where women joined male-dominated
industries. Indeed, nationwide growth in almost all industries was higher for women than
for men, implying that that sectors became feminized over time. However, the correlation
between female and male growth within industries was very high over this period, indicating
that within-industry shifts were not the main driver of changes in relative labor demand for
women.
The measure of labor demand for each gender exploits the fact that different industries
employ men and women in different proportions. We would observe an increase in relative
labor demand for women if between-industry shifts in labor demand, such as from sector-
specific productivity shocks or from changes in product demand (either arising from domestic
sources or from international trade), led industries that predominantly employed men to de-
cline (or grow relatively less) than industries that employed relatively more women. Indeed, I
find that industries that employed relatively more women initially experienced larger growth.
These findings mirror those in Aguayo-Tellez et al. (2010), who find a re-allocation in em-
ployment across sectors in favor of women in Mexico. They argue that policies connected to
trade liberalization led to a shift in labor demand toward industries that disproportionately
employed women and raised their wages.
Evaluating the sector-level census data used in this paper, I find that for sectors that
disproportionately employed men, the main sources of decline in employment shares were
concentrated in a subset of sectors in agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting, and manufac-
turing. The latter includes industries in the manufacturing of metal industries, machinery
and equipment, and non-metallic minerals. These sectors also suffered among the largest
wage declines in the data. Previous work has documented the impact of trade liberalization,
including the passage of NAFTA in 1994, as triggering the decline in these sectors (Nicita,
2004; Hanson and Harrison, 1999; Revenga, 1997).
For women, sources of employment growth in manufacturing included the clothing in-
dustry and the food industry (especially in the 1990s), but in general growth in sectors that
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employed disproportionately more women was more varied and mainly concentrated outside
of manufacturing. Women’s employment increased in a variety of sectors in wholesale and
retail commerce. Growth in household employees in private households, one of the biggest
employers of women, facilitated the entry of less-skilled women into the workforce. In addi-
tion to being one of the biggest sources of employment growth, this industry also experienced
among the largest wage growth between 1990 and 2010 (a difference in average log wages of
0.22). This indicates that employment growth in female-centric sectors was not merely due
to a secular increase in labor supply among women. Other sectors that were disproportion-
ately likely to employ women include services in real estate, finance, and other professional
services. This growth facilitated the entry of more-skilled women into the workforce in major
cities. These trends parallel those in the U.S. and many other countries.21
These labor demand shifts were not evenly dispersed across the country. Growth in
women’s employment in small-scale manufacturing (clothes, food) occurred predominantly
in the border region,22 as well as the central belt and Mexico City regions. Growth in services
was concentrated in the major cities of the same areas. To summarize, the growth in a subset
of manufacturing sectors and in services drove the increase in the women’s employment in the
border, capital, and center regions, with large increases in women’s labor force participation
since 1990. Men’s employment grew relatively more slowly, with negative shocks to male-
dominated sectors in agriculture throughout rural parts of the country, and negative shocks
to manufacturing in the border, capital, and center regions.
21 Rendall (2017) and Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan (2012) provide a theoretical foundation for a shift in
labor market demand in favor of “brain” versus “brawn”, where women are assumed to have a comparative
advantage in “brain”.
22 Much of this growth came from the expansion in maquiladoras, which increased labor market opportu-
nities for women and were mainly located in the border.
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2.5 Estimating the impact of relative bargaining power on mar-
riage
To estimate the impact of changes in relative labor demand for women on marriage and
related outcomes, I estimate variants of the following reduced-form specification for Mexican
municipalities:
ym,y,a = λ+ βRBPm,y +αF (X)m,y,a + γm + δy + θa + εm,y,a. (2.1)
I collapse observations into municipality-age-year-education cells, where each observation
represents a woman of age a in a given census year y living in municipality m. RBP is relative
bargaining power in the labor market, as described earlier. I include municipality fixed
effects, which control for unobservable differences common to municipalities, age fixed effects,
which control for differences in marriage propensity across ages, and year fixed effects, which
control for nationwide shocks to marriage. In addition, some specifications include education
fixed effects, year by education interactions, age by education interactions, and quadratic
polynomials in the proportion of the local population that is male in F (X). I use four
education categories: individuals with less than primary schooling completed, individuals
who completed primary school, individuals who completed lower secondary schooling, and
individuals who completed secondary schooling or more.
The demographic controls are designed to control for the effects of the sex ratio, which
may have an important, independent role in influencing marriage decisions (Abramitzky,
Delavande, and Vasconcelos, 2011; Angrist, 2002; Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix, 2002). To
capture the effects of the relevant demographics, I compute local populations of men and
women at each age and use the male proportion of the population for a given woman’s age
as the relevant control, which provides a more precisely estimated effect of the relevant sex
ratio than a coarser measure across a wider age interval.23 All regressions are limited to
23 Staggering the relevant sex ratio, i.e. identifying the number of men for slightly younger women, leads
to very similar results, so I use same-age proportions for simplicity.
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cells with non-missing observations for men and women in all ages between 22-44. I use
census-provided weights. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-level.
2.5.1 Results of the estimation
The results from the main specification can be found in Panel A in Table 5. Column
(1) includes only municipality, year, and age fixed effects. In columns (2) and (3) I add
more of the controls described in equation (1). The estimate of β changes little, with the
specification in column (3) indicating that a 10% increase in relative labor market demand
leads to a 1.3% decline in the probability of being married. Using the actual change in
relative labor demand and the mean change in marriage rates, I find that these estimates
imply that about a quarter of the decline in marriage can be explained by the change in
relative labor market opportunities for women.
To disentangle whether changes in labor demand for men or women are driving the
results, I separate the shift-share index into its representative parts by gender. Results are
presented in Panel B of Table 5. Column (3), which includes the most controls, indicates
that a 10% increase in potential wages for women, conditional on men’s potential wages,
decreases the probability of a woman being married by 0.9%. A 10% increase in potential
wages for men, conditional on women’s potential wages, increases the probability of marriage
by 1.5%. These results are consistent with the theory: increases in men’s labor demand, and
hence increases in their potential wages, amplify the attractiveness of marriage, whereas
improvements in women’s labor demand decrease the gains to marriage. In the specification
with the most controls, an F Test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the magnitude of
the coefficients at the 5% level.
The magnitude of the male coefficent is larger. One possible reason for this is that the
effects of the labor demand proxy are driven by men’s wages, not women’s wages. This makes
sense especially in a setting where fewer than half of all women work, such that women’s
wages may play a less important role in household decisions. Morever, even if a woman does
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not expect to work, a decline in men’s wages may lead her to delay, if not abstain from,
marriage. Indeed, the results in Table 7 show the biggest impacts at the youngest ages and a
weaker effect at higher ages. Another possibility for the difference in estimates of men’s and
women’s potential wages is individual heterogeneity. It is possible that the labor demand
proxy does a better job of predicting men’s wages since men have uniformly high labor force
participation rates, whereas women who work comprise a self-selected sample that may not
be as representative of women’s outside option.
2.5.2 Other household outcomes and heterogeneity in effects
In this section I evaluate the impact of changes in relative labor demand on other relevant
household formation outcomes. Results are shown in Table 6. Column (1) shows the results
of estimating the impact of the relative labor demand index on divorce. The coefficient
is close to zero, indicating that increases in labor demand for women’s do not appear to
increase exit from marriage. Column (2) indicates that a 10% increase in the relative labor
demand index increases the probability that a woman is a head of the household by 0.37%.
Turning to fertility-related outcomes, column (3) shows that a 10% increase in relative labor
demand for women increases the probability of there being no children in the household by
1.1%. To focus on an outcome commonly studied in the U.S and other developing countries
but less well-studied in the developing countries, I look at single motherhood and find a
small increase in the probability of single motherhood.24 Finally, I look at the impact on
the probability of being a widow and find no statistically significant effect. Macabre theories
aside, there is no reason to think that relative wages would affect widowhood status, so this
may be seen as a falsification test.25 Together, these results indicate that an increase in
24 Single motherhood increased from 10% in 1990 to 16% in 2010. Mexico has provided family planning
since 1974, when a law establishing free family planning services was passed, though access to clinics providing
these services, especially in rural areas, remains an issue. Abortion is regulated at the state level and remains
very rare in Mexico. Since 2007, abortion has been available to women living in Mexico City (in limited
circumstances), and some, but not all, states have followed in liberalizing their abortion laws.
25 There is a mechanical correlation between widowhood and marriage in the sense that one must have
been married to be widowed, so relative wage options can influence widowhood via their effect on marriage.
Nevertheless, the number of widows in this age range is very small, so such an effect would be difficult to
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women’s relative labor demand does not only lead reduce the likelihood of marriage; it also
causes a fundamental change in status within the household, including changes in fertility.
These results are consistent with other work that shows that non-labor sources of income,
when directed toward women and away from men, increase their bargaining power in the
household (e.g. Duflo, 2003; Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales, 1997).
Table 7 shows results by age grouping. The results are not surprising: the largest impacts
are among women in their twenties, i.e. those most likely on the margin of considering
marriage. Impacts become progressively smaller among women past age 29, and the impact
is close to zero among women ages 50-59.
Turning to regional impacts, Table 8 shows the results of estimating the main specifi-
cation separately for municipalities in the border, north, center, capital, and south of the
country. The largest results are in the border region with the U.S., and the weakest results
are in the south, which is more rural and agricultural than other parts of the country. Sepa-
rating individuals by urban and rural status shows much larger results in magnitude among
urban residents (results not shown here). These results suggest that the biggest impacts are
among wealthier, more educated, and more urbanized regions. These results are consistent
with the sources of growth in relative labor demand for women: regions that had a higher
concentration of female-centric sectors that subsequently saw larger increase in employment
also saw greater decreases in the likelihood of marriage.
Table 9 shows the results of estimating equation (1) separately for four educational cat-
egories. The magnitude of the estimated impact of changes in relative labor demand for
women generally increases with a woman’s level of education. These results are consistent
with the earlier results in Table 5 and with the conceptual framework suggested earlier. If
women’s potential wages are sufficiently low, they may not be on the margin between choos-
ing or foregoing marriage because an increase in relative wages is not enough for them to
earn an independent living. In this framework, the relative wage is most relevant for women
detect.
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who can earn a high enough wage to be able to delay or abstain from marriage.
It is important to note that although the results on heterogeneity across educational
groups are consistent with theory, the theoretical justification is not the only reason why
results are weaker for women with less education. An alternative explanation follows from
the identification strategy employed here: an ideal measure of relative labor market oppor-
tunities would differ across all observable and unobservable characteristics to capture each
individual’s outside option. The shift-share proxy for labor demand, by construction, has
the virtue of exploiting all demand shocks that differentially affect employment across sec-
tors, as opposed to focusing on demand shocks solely due to a single mechanism, such as
particular policies (e.g. a reduction in tariffs). Yet there is no reason to believe that labor
market shocks across industries affect all individuals equally. First, the types of shocks across
industries may differentially affect individuals of varying types, insofar as industries differ in
which skill types they hire. 26 Second, if less-educated women have more elastic labor sup-
ply, then increases in demand may not translate to large increases in wages. Third, research
on Mexican labor markets and the gender wage gap has found that the unexplained wage
gap is larger for less-skilled women than for more-skilled women, which may be evidence of
greater wage discrimination against less-skilled women (Popli, 2013). All of these may lead
to a finding of heterogeneous effects even in the absence of true heterogeneity.
2.6 Conclusion
As in the U.S. and much of Europe, women in Latin America today are more likely to be
single, to delay getting married, to head a household, and to be single mothers. However,
outside of the U.S., the extent to which changes in women’s employment and wages have
affected these trends has not been studied. This paper exploits exogenous shocks to labor
demand across Mexican municipalities to identify sources of bargaining power in the labor
26 For instance, suppose demand for the output of the financial services sector increases. This increase in
demand may not translate into a meaningful increase in potential wages for an unskilled woman living in a
municipality with a high employment base in financial services
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market. Using the resulting measure of women’s labor demand relative to men’s labor
demand, I show a causal link between women’s relative labor market opportunities and
family formation outcomes. These results provide support for the theories of new home
economics, which argue that that a rise in women’s potential wages reduces the traditional
gains to marriage due to specialization.
It is also possible that the effects observed here represent “disequilibrium effects.”27 In
that case, it remains an open question as to whether the declines in marriage observed
thus far continue, or whether an evolution in gender norms allows a turnaround in family
formation.
While Mexico, along with much of Latin America, has followed a similar demographic
trajectory as the U.S. and Western Europe, it nevertheless has failed to develop a welfare
system providing unemployment insurance and social support. The findings of this paper
indicate that the rise in relative labor demand has increased women’s bargaining power and
has led to a decline in marriage. At the same time, increasing numbers of single individuals
without the benefit of a social safety net may also lead to more individuals being vulnerable
to poverty. The connection between labor markets and changing family patterns, then,
should be of broad interest to policymakers.
27 Pollak (2016) notes that women’s greater role in market work has disrupted traditional expectations
about gender norms in the home. In the long run—that is, longer than the two ten-year differences observed
here—norms may catch up to labor market realities, and the observed relationship between labor market
opportunities and marriage may dissipate. For evidence on this point with respect to fertility rather than
marriage, see Garc´ıa-Manglano, Nollenberger, and Sevilla (2014). For a broader discussion on how changes
in gender relationships affect fertility and marriage, see Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappeg˚ard (2015).
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: Male share of 3-digit sectors between 1990 and 2010
Notes: Industry groupings are at the 3-digit level. The 45 degree line is shown for
comparison. Data come from the Mexican Censuses 1990-2010.
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Figure 2.2: Female to male wage ratio over time
Notes: Wage ratio 1 shows the hourly wage for all with positive hours, after trimming both
ends at 1%. Wage ratio 2 shows the hourly wage for all with more than 30 hours, after
trimming both ends at 1%. Wage ratio 3 shows the hourly wage for all with positive hours,
after trimming both ends at 2%. Wage ratio 4 shows the hourly wage for all with more
than 30 hours, after trimming both ends at 2%. Data come from the Mexican Censuses
1990-2010.
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Figure 2.3: Mean employment-to-population ratio of women across years of schooling
Notes: Each point represents the mean employment-to-population ratio of women aged
22-44 for women with a given number of years of schooling. Only individuals reporting
positive income and hours are counted as employed. Individuals reporting more than 18
year of schooling are all grouped into the category “18.” Data come from the Mexican
Censuses 1990-2010.
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Figure 2.4: Map of Mexico
Notes: This graph displays a map of Mexican federal entities according to region.
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Figure 2.5: Mean employment-to-population rates of women across regions in Mexico
Notes: See Figure 4 for which states are included in which region. The graph shows mean
employment-to-population rates in each region across time for women aged 22-44. Data
come from the Mexican Censuses 1990-2010.
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Figure 2.6: Mean employment-to-population rates of women across educational groups in
Mexico
Notes: The graph shows mean employment-to-population rates for groups with different
levels of schooling. The lowest group only includes women with less than primary
schooling; the next group only includes women with primary schooling; the next group
includes women with lower secondary completed; and the last group includes women with
secondary schooling complete or more. Data come from the Mexican Censuses 1990-2010.
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Figure 2.7: Mean marriage rates by age group
Notes: The graph shows mean marriage rates for women in different age groups. Data
come from the Mexican Censuses 1990-2010.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Individual wage regression results
Log (wage) Log (wage) Log (wage) Log (wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.015 0.048** 0.058** 0.12***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021)
Experience 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.025***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.00071)
Experienceˆ2 -0.00060*** -0.00060*** -0.00035***
(0.000026) (0.000025) (9.0e-06)
Years of schooling 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.047***
(0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0012)






Observations 1,620,918 1,620,918 1,620,918 1,544,595
R-squared 0.000 0.190 0.190 0.288
Industry and Occupation dummies No No No Yes
Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Coefficients are
from OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the wage in
2010 pesos. Data come from the 1990 Population Census. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.2: Individual wage regression results
Log (wage) Log (wage) Log (wage) Log (wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.014 0.10*** 0.27*** 0.23***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.026) (0.021)
Experience 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.023***
(0.00080) (0.00080) (0.00056)
Experienceˆ2 -0.00039*** -0.00040*** -0.00030***
(0.000019) (0.000019) (0.000010)
Years of schooling 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.078***
(0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0028)






Observations 2,064,853 2,051,924 2,051,924 1,921,177
R-squared 0.000 0.348 0.351 0.430
Industry and Occupation dummies No No No Yes
Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Coefficients are
from OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the wage in
2010 pesos. Data come from the 2000 Population Census. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.3: Individual wage regression results
Log (wage) Log (wage) Log (wage) Log (wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.035* 0.13*** 0.34*** 0.28***
(0.021) (0.014) (0.025) (0.015)
Experience 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.019***
(0.00077) (0.00076) (0.00049)
Experienceˆ2 -0.00030*** -0.00031*** -0.00025***
(0.000014) (0.000014) (8.2e-06)
Years of schooling 0.087*** 0.10*** 0.064***
(0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0020)






Observations 2,238,244 2,227,491 2,227,491 2,048,993
R-squared 0.001 0.254 0.259 0.356
Industry and Occupation dummies No No No Yes
Standard errors are clustered at the state level and reported in parentheses. Coefficients are
from OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the wage in
2010 pesos. Data come from the 2010 Population Census. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Summary statistics for women aged 22-44 in the Mexican Population Census are shown.
Census-provided weights are used.
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Relative labor demand -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.13***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.025)
Panel B
Female labor demand proxy -0.086*** -0.080*** -0.090***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Male labor demand proxy 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.15***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027)
F test (p value) 0.1809 0.0640 0.0348
Observations 4,099,751 4,099,751 4,099,751
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes
Education Controls No Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses. The
dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent is married. Panels A shows the
impact of relative labor demand, defined as the difference between the index for female
labor demand and male labor demand, as described in the text. Panel B shows the impact
of shift-share index for each gender separately. The p-values of an F test of the equality of
the magnitude of the coefficients on the male and female wage proxies in Panel B are also
shown. Each unit of observation is a woman aged 22-44. Census-provided weights are used.
Education controls include four categories for schooling, and are entered individually and
interacted with the year in the second column. The third column adds education x age
fixed effects and population controls, which include a quadratic polynomial in the local
proportion of men in each individual’s age. Data come from the 1990, 2000, and 2010
Population Censuses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.6: Impact of relative labor demand on family-related outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Divorced Female head No children Single mom Widowed
of household in household
Relative labor demand 0.0079 0.037*** 0.11*** 0.026* -0.0029
(0.0096) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.0026)
Observations 4,099,751 4,042,810 4,018,083 4,018,083 4,099,751
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses. The
dependent variable (shown in the column heading) is a dummy variable. Each unit of
observation is a woman aged 22-44. Census-provided weights are used. Education controls
include four categories for schooling, and are entered individually and interacted with the
year in the second column. The third column adds education x age fixed effects and
population controls, which include a quadratic polynomial in the local proportion of men in
each individual’s age. Data come from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 Population Censuses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.7: Impact of relative labor demand on marriage by age grouping
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Married Married Married Married Married
Ages 16-21 Ages 22-29 Ages 30-39 Ages 40-49 Ages 50-59
Relative labor demand -0.13*** -0.20*** -0.083*** -0.067*** 0.029
(0.025) (0.029) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Observations 1,543,961 1,722,568 1,722,545 1,191,228 793,024
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses. The
dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent is married. Each unit of
observation is a woman in a given age interval. Census-provided weights are used.
Education controls include four categories for schooling. Controls include education,
education x year, education x age fixed effects and population controls, which include a
quadratic polynomial in the local proportion of men in each individual’s age. Data come
from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 Population Censuses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.8: Impact of relative labor demand on marriage across regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Border North Center Capital South
Relative labor demand -0.16*** -0.096** -0.11*** -0.11** -0.032
(0.055) (0.046) (0.027) (0.048) (0.025)
Observations 658,226 345,687 1,630,434 944,933 520,471
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses. The
dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent is married. Each unit of
observation is a woman aged 22-44. Census-provided weights are used. Each column shows
results for women living in the region in the column heading. Education controls include
four categories for schooling. Controls include education, education x year, education x age
fixed effects and population controls, which include a quadratic polynomial in the local
proportion of men in each individual’s age. Data come from the 1990, 2000, and 2010
Population Censuses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.9: Impact of relative labor demand on marriage by educational grouping
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Married Married Married Married
Relative labor demand -0.052*** -0.11*** -0.18*** -0.21***
(0.019) (0.025) (0.032) (0.035)
Observations 931,380 1,056,583 1,060,187 1,051,601
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parentheses. The
dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent is married. Each unit of
observation is a woman aged 22-44. Census-provided weights are used. Each column
divides women into a separate education category: column 1 only includes women with less
than primary schooling; column 2 only includes women with primary schooling; column 3
includes women with lower secondary completed; and column 4 includes women with
secondary schooling complete or more. Controls include education, education x year,
education x age fixed effects and population controls, which include a quadratic polynomial
in the local proportion of men in each individual’s age. Data come from the 1990, 2000,
and 2010 Population Censuses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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CHAPTER III
The Wage Distribution, Local Labor Market
Outcomes, and the Chinese Import Shock
3.1 Introduction
China’s transition from central planning to a market economy and its integration into
world markets has had a striking impact on international trade. During the same period,
manufacturing employment has fallen and wage inequality has risen in many countries. The
simultaneity of these events has led to a contentious debate among policymakers and the
public regarding to what extent these trends are linked. It has also sparked a large and
growing literature among economists, with recent work on how China has shaped local
economies1, the time-paths of wages2, job polarization3, marriage and divorce4, prices5,
innovation6, and plant entry and exit.7
More broadly, a large body of work has studied the impact of trade shocks, including
tariff cuts, currency crises, offshoring, and trade penetration from developed countries, on
1 Autor et al. (2013) study local labor markets in the U.S., and Donoso, Martin, and Minondo (2015),
Balsik, Jensen, and Salvanes (2015), Malgouyres (2017), and Dauth, Findeisen, and Suedekum (2014) apply
similar methods in Spain, Norway, France, and Germany, respectively.
2 See Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014).
3 See Keller and Utar (2016).
4 See Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2017).
5 See Auer, Degen, and Fischer (2013) as well as the citations therein.
6 Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) use plant-level data to argue that Chinese import competition
led to greater research and development and patenting in their sample of European countries.
7 Recent examples include Ashournia, Munch, and Nguyen (2014) and Utar and Ruiz (2013).
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poor and middle-income developing countries. This paper examines the impact of rising
Chinese export supplies on Mexico’s local labor markets and relates to several strands in
the literature on trade, development, and labor markets. In particular, a number of papers8
studies Mexico’s experience in the 1990s, including impacts on employment, wages, and
inequality, after it began trade liberalization in the mid 1980s, culminating in the passage
of the North American Free Trade Act.
This paper, instead, focuses on the post-NAFTA period in Mexico and the role that Chi-
nese trade competition played in the evolution of Mexico’s manufacturing industries. During
this period, wage growth was smallest in the border states, which specialize in industries with
the greatest overlap in Chinese export supplies. Border states also have among the highest
mean wages in Mexico, and overall wage inequality declined during this period. I find that
Chinese trade shocks led to consistently negative impacts across the conditional wage dis-
tribution, with workers in higher quantiles in manufacturing suffering slightly larger wage
decreases than workers in lower quantiles. These striking results are among the first findings
on the impact of Chinese trade on the wage distribution in an export-oriented, middle-income
country.
It is possible to evaluate the impacts of trade, globalization, and outsourcing on multiple
dimensions: at the firm, plant, regional, macro, and industry levels. This paper adopts the
regional approach described in Autor et al. (2013), who provide a theoretically-grounded
methodology to identify the causal impact of increasing Chinese exports on local labor mar-
kets. One advantage of the local labor markets approach is that it allows identification of
spillover effects across industries. For instance, if trade shocks lead the least-skilled to lose
their jobs in tradeable sectors and gain entry-level jobs in non-tradeable sectors, then a com-
parison between industries that are directly exposed to the trade shock and those that are
not directly exposed would underestimate the impact of trade. Ebenstein, Harrison, McMil-
lan, and Phillips (2014) examine the effects of trade and offshoring on wages in the U.S. and
8 Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) contains a detailed survey of many of these papers.
100
find no significant effects at the industry level, but they find substantial negative effects at
the occupational level. The findings in this paper show that workers in manufacturing and
outside of manufacturing show similar declines in wages in municipalities more exposed to
Chinese export shocks.
While much of the focus in the recent literature, both theoretically and empirically, has
been on how trade between low-income countries affects high-income counties, or vice versa,
the effects of trade penetration from one developing country onto another are less studied.
Mexico, like China, began a rapid shift from a fairly closed economy to an open one in
the 1980s and is now firmly dependent on trade, especially with the U.S., its biggest trade
partner. With China’s rise, Mexico was arguably hit twice: first, via its domestic suppliers
facing import competition from China, and second, via its customers in the U.S. potentially
switching from Mexican to Chinese goods. Moreover, while other developing countries may
also benefit from China’s rise by being able to export minerals and raw materials to China
(Hanson, 2010), Mexico exports relatively little of these commodities.
It is also important to consider institutional differences among high-income and low-
income countries when considering how persistent labor market effects are likely to be. In
standard economic theory we would expect for transitory trade shocks to be arbitraged away
across space and for labor markets to adjust via mobility and firm reallocation in the long
run. Jakubik and Kummritz (2017) argue that precisely this is happening in the U.S. On
the other hand, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017) find that the effects of tariff cut-induced
shocks to labor markets in Brazil have grown, rather than being arbitraged away, over the
course of twenty years at the regional level.
Mexico is also an interesting case study because its potential margins of adjustment are
different. Mexico has no social safety net to deal with major labor demand shocks, and
employment remains high even in crises, though workers are more likely to exit the formal
sector and enter the informal sector during crises. Union protections are weak to nonexistent,
no centralized wage bargaining mechanism exists for workers in the manufacturing industry,
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and hence workers have little bargaining power. It follows that wages are a potentially more
important margin of adjustment here than in Europe or the U.S., where a wide body of work
has found evidence of downward wage rigidities.
To study the effects of rising Chinese export supplies, I use cross-sectional data from the
decennial Population Censuses in 2000 and 2010. Thus, the difference in local labor market
outcomes between 2000 and 2010 identifies the medium-run impact of the Chinese shock.
This period is ideally suited for the question because Chinese exports to Mexico, and to
much of the rest of the world, started rising sharply in 2001, the year when China acceded to
the WTO. The data allow me to control for a rich set of characteristics also important in the
evolution of manufacturing employment and wages and provide information representative
of the entire country using consistent municipality identifiers across time. Other work on
Mexican labor markets has typically used the country’s labor force survey, but the survey is
not representative at the municipality level, did not cover much of the country prior to 2005,
and its weighting was altered in 2005, making comparisons across time not feasible (Bosch
and Campos-Vazquez, 2014).9 Although the Population Censuses allow me to identify net
impacts at the local labor market level, they do not, however, allow me to match workers to
firms or to perform analysis at the plant level.
The identification strategy takes advantage of the fact that municipalities in Mexico
are differentially affected by Chinese export shocks due to their industry structure prior to
China’s growth. Research using a similar methodology and focusing specifically on the role
of rising Chinese trade typically finds negative impacts. Autor et al. (2013) find negative
impacts on local wages, though these effects are entirely in non-tradeable sectors; they detect
no impacts on wages in manufacturing.10 Other work (Ashournia, Munch, and Nguyen, 2014;
Donoso, Mart´ın, and Minondo, 2015; Malgouyres, 2017) finds negative impacts in Denmark,
Spain, and France, respectively. Balsvik, Jensen, and Salvanes (2015), however, do not find
9 The survey is now called Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacio´n y Empleo (The National Survey of Occupation
and Employment). It has been altered and expanded several times since the 1970s, when it first began.
10 In a companion piece exploiting longitudinal data on workers in the U.S., Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and
Song (2014) find persistent, negative wage effects.
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any impact of rising Chinese exports on wages in Norway.11 These differing results point
to the importance of local institutions and policies in establishing whether labor demand
shocks cause adjustments along employment, wage, or labor mobility margins.
3.2 Chinese growth, manufacturing, and regional exposure in Mex-
ico
3.2.1 Chinese export growth
The share of the population employed in manufacturing declined during the 2000s in
Mexico, as in the U.S., although not in absolute numbers. Figure 1 shows the evolution
of employment in manufacturing, services, agriculture, and other goods-producing sectors
(mining and construction), relative to baseline levels in the 1999 Mexican Economic Survey.12
Employment has increased sharply in services, but manufacturing employment has increased
modestly as well, despite the combination of Chinese export shocks, skill-biased technolog-
ical change, and other factors typically associated with declines in overall manufacturing
employment in high-income countries in the last two decades.
When Mexico adopted an export-oriented strategy, policymakers hoped to emulate East
Asian economies (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong) that had kickstarted their own development
with simple export-assembly operations and gradually transitioned into producing more com-
plex, higher-value products (Hanson, 2010; Enright, Scott, and Dodwell, 1997). Mexico’s
manufacturing industries, however, continue to be labor-intensive. Hanson (2010) suggests
that Mexico’s dependence on labor-intensive manufacturing, as well as the overlap between
the industries that both countries have specialized in producing, made it particularly vul-
nerable to China’s rise in the 2000s.
To get a sense of China’s rise, Figure 2 shows the growth in the value of imports from
11 They note that Norway’s centralized wage bargaining probably induces effects along the employment,
rather than wage, margin.
12 These data are computed from the Mexican Economic Censuses from 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014.
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China into Mexico, the United States, as well as into other large economies in Latin America
for comparison. All values are in U.S. dollars, adjusted for inflation, and then normalized to
100 in 1995. Even accounting for the large rise in imports into the U.S. over this period, the
rate of growth of Chinese imports into Mexico has been far more dramatic: imports have
increased close to a hundredfold over this period. This growth became especially dramatic
after 2001, when China entered the World Trade Organization. In particular, Chinese trade
made up less than 2% of the value of Mexico’s imports in 2000 and surged to about 18%
of imports in 2015 (see Figure 3). Figure 4 shows the growth of imports into the U.S.
from China, Mexico, Canada, and the rest of the world. Growth from China and Mexico
closely tracked each other until about 2001, when Chinese import growth surged ahead of
other countries. Imports from Mexico continued to increase at a more modest rate over this
period.
One can imagine a counterfactual exercise that explores what U.S. imports from Mexico
would have looked like had China not increased its exports in the 2000s. Hanson and
Robertson (2010) perform such an exercise using a gravity model of trade and find that
Mexico—while more exposed than other countries in their sample—would have faced only
moderately higher export demand had Chinese exports stayed constant. They conclude
that rising Chinese exports have served as a modest negative shock to demand for Mexico’s
exports.
3.2.2 Industry structure and regional variation
The identification strategy of this paper relies on variation in exposure to Chinese ex-
ports across industries, interacted with the importance of these industries in each regional
economy. Before moving on to the theoretical framework and the estimation, this section
briefly describes industries and spatial patterns in manufacturing in Mexico.
China has not increased its exports uniformly across sectors. Using a two-digit SITC
classification to illustrate the main points, China’s biggest exports worldwide in 2010 were
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in office machines, electric machinery, and telecommunications. Other large industries, such
as metalworking, paper and wood, and pharmaceuticals, have had less import exposure in
partner countries. A similar pattern plays out when looking at exports to Mexico only.
While Mexico specializes in some of these industries, it also produces passenger vehicles and
food products, which benefit from having lower transportation costs to the U.S. market, and
which have been less affected by direct import competition from China.13
Mexico’s manufacturing industries are concentrated in the country’s northern border
region with the U.S., as well as its densely populated central belt, which includes major cities
like Mexico City and Guadalajara. As in the U.S., manufacturing exhibits agglomeration
economies. For instance, Mexico’s shoe industry is concentrated around the city of Leo´n,
Guanajuato. While smaller export-assembly plants (maquiladoras) in sectors like electronics,
which were heavily exposed to Chinese trade competition since 2000, are more likely to be
in the border region, other types of manufacturing are more prevalent in the interior of the
country. For example, the food industry is clustered around the Mexico City metropolitan
area, and the automotive industry has established plants throughout states in the interior.
This spatial concentration of industries provides a suggestive interpretation of wage
changes between 2000 and 2010 in Mexico. As Figure 5 illustrates, while mean wages in-
creased across all regions in Mexico, wage growth was smallest in the border region. The
extent to which local labor markets more exposed to Chinese import competition suffered
greater wage declines is investigated in the causal analysis that follows.
3.3 Empirical estimation of China’s export growth
3.3.1 Conceptual framework for evaluating regional impacts of China’s rise
This paper studies the impact on local labor markets of rising exports from China. The
growing body of work taking a local labor markets approach is based on the theoretical
13 See Mendoza Cota (2015) for a detailed analysis of Mexico’s comparative advantage across manufacturing
industries.
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framework in Autor et al. (2013), which I describe in what follows. Each region inside
of a country is modeled as a small open economy. The purpose of this framework is to
evaluate how a rise in China exports affects each region’s labor market outcomes, such as
employment and wages, as well as other outcomes that may be tied to local labor markets,
such as marriage, divorce, and human capital. Autor et al. (2013) link trade quantities,
rather than trade prices, into outcomes in labor markets because data on industry import
prices are not available, an approach taken in this paper as well.14
Each region produces goods, which can be tradeable (e.g. manufacturing) or non-
tradeable. A positive productivity shock leads Chinese exports to rise. This may happen
as the economy shifts from centralized planning to being market-based or as institutions,
policies, and productive capabilities improve following WTO accession. Importantly, the
productivity shock results from forces that are internal to China (e.g. not because of rising
demand in an external country). The impacts on employment and wages depend on China’s
change in demand for that region’s exports and change in demand for that region’s output to
any market in which it competes with China. It follows that as China increases its exports
in a good produced by a region, wages and employment in the tradeables sector decrease,
and employment in the non-tradeable sector increases. Of course, the opposite story holds
if China’s demand for imports rises, but as a practical matter this channel is less important
in the case of Mexico: while China presently makes up about 18% of Mexico’s imports (the
second biggest source following the U.S.), China receives less than 2% of its exports (with
the U.S. receiving over 80%). Chinese-Mexican trade is particularly imbalanced, which in
the context of the theory implies that a reduction in labor demand in the tradeables sector
as import penetration increases is not balanced by an increase in labor demand as export
opportunities grow.
14 There are alternative frameworks for describing the impact of Chinese growth on other countries. Kovak
(2013) and Topalova (2010) focus on trade prices rather than quantities but also take a regional approach.
Ashournia et al. (2014) describe a partial equalibrium trade model in which Chinese export growth alters
firms’ product demand and apply it to study firm-level outcomes.
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3.3.2 Empirical approach
The conceptual framework described above shows how a shock to Chinese supply alters
the demand for goods produced in each local labor market. A region will be more impacted
by Chinese trade growth when Chinese exports in a particular sector increase and when
the regional share of employment in that sector is greater. To illustrate what this means,
suppose that Chinese exports of electronics to Mexico increase. Only places that produce
electronics in Mexico are directly affected. If a particular region contains, say, a tenth of
Mexico’s total employment in electronics production, that region gets assigned a tenth of
the rise in imports from China. This calculation is applied to each tradeable sector and then
these import measures are summed to generate a measure of a region’s import penetration
in dollars. The calculation is then scaled by the total number of workers in the region to
arrive at a measure of import penetration per worker.










In this expression, Lm,j,t=1998 denotes employment in industry j (where M refers to the
set of industries in manufacturing) in municipality m in 1998, Lj,t=1998 denotes aggregate
employment in Mexico in manufacturing industry j in 1998, ∆Importsj denotes the change in
Mexican imports from China between 2000 and 2010, and Lm,t=1998 denotes total employment
in municipality m in 1998. The first fraction represents the share of demand for a given
industry that local manufacturers produce. The change in import values represents the
increase in China’s export supplies. The measure is divided by the total number of workers
in the region to proxy for local labor market exposure at the worker level. Figure 6 illustrates
import exposure across Mexico: it is highly correlated with manufacturing, with places
mainly in the north and central region most exposed.15
15 Large municipalities with the highest exposure include Nogales, Agua Prieta, and San Luis R´ıo Colorado
in Sonora; Jua´rez and Chihuahua in Chihuahua; Matamoros in Tamaulipas; Acun˜a in Coahuila; and Tecate
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As noted in Autor et al. (2013) and subsequent work, the identifying variation in this
measure depends on the degree of the employment mix in manufacturing, as well as how
specialized municipalities are in industries that are subject to increases in export supplies.
Since the resulting measure is correlated with how much of the local employment base is
composed of manufacturing, I control directly for the manufacturing share of employment
in the econometric specifications. The remaining variation, then, is based only on local
concentration in industries subject to import shocks after adjusting for local manufacturing
concentration.
To identify the relationship between import exposure and changes in local labor market
conditions, I estimate variants of the following specification:
∆Ym = γ + β∆Expm +X
′
mδ + λr + εm. (3.2)
∆Ym denotes the change between 2000 and 2010 in the outcome of interest (e.g. the av-
erage of the natural logarithm of wages or the share of the working-age population employed
in manufacturing in municipality m). Some specifications also contain a vector, denoted
here by Xm, that contains a rich set of variables controlling for baseline characteristics of
the labor force and demographic composition that may be related to changes in manufactur-
ing employment. The vector λr contains dummies for five of six regions in Mexico. These
regional dummies flexibly control for region-specific trends in outcomes in a first-differenced
specification. The coefficient of interest is β, which indicates the effect of a change in a
municipality’s import exposure to growing Chinese exports. Standard errors are clustered
at the state level to control for spatial correlation.
A potential issue with the estimation strategy here is the endogeneity of the import expo-
sure measure since an unobserved domestic demand shock could be picked up by the import
measure. For instance, an industry facing a positive demand shock may grow domestically
in Baja California. All of these are in border states and are notable for their maquiladoras. El Salto in
Jalisco has the highest import penetration among municipalities deeper in the interior of the country.
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and at the same time import more from China. In such a scenario, the OLS estimator of β
would be biased up (if the true effect is negative). In general, industry-based shocks, either
from domestic demand or from foreign trade in other countries, could also affect Mexican
imports from China, leading to a positive or negative bias, depending on the nature of the
shock.
Following Autor et al. (2013) and other researchers studying the impact of an export
supply shock in China, I instrument domestic changes in imports with changes in imports
into other countries also affected by the supply shock. Formally, the instrumental variable










This expression replaces imports into Mexico with the sum of exports into a basket of
similar countries, denoted by ∆Importsoj . This instrumental variables strategy relies on
the assumption that the main driver in the import measure is a positive shock to Chinese
productivity, which would have increased Chinese exports across a similar basket of goods
in other countries. This is reflected in the similarity across countries in which goods are
imported from China and in the well-documented history of factors that led to China’s
manufacturing growth, as described in a previous section.
Threats to identification can come from several sources, which also arise in the case
of Autor et al. (2013). Demand shocks within sectors can be correlated across different
countries. For instance, the U.S. and Mexico share economic cycles and are major trading
partners. In the analysis, I use a set of countries (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Spain, and
Venezuela) that are comparable to Mexico and likely to face similar supply shocks from
China, but that are not among the top exporters to or importers from Mexico.16 Robustness
checks using other middle-income countries with available data do not alter the results in
16 Mexico’s top export destinations are the U.S. and Canada. All other countries make up less than 2%
of Mexico’s exports. Top exporting countries to Mexico are (in descending order) the U.S., China, Japan,
Germany, and Korea.
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this paper. It is also theoretically possible that some sectors in Mexico suffer negative
productivity or technology shocks, leading to a rise in Chinese imports from these sectors.
Although I cannot directly refute this, the available evidence suggests that the sudden and
dramatic growth in Chinese productivity has been responsible for China’s increasing share
of exports, rather than processes internal to Mexico.
Finally, it is important to note that the measure, as constructed here, is designed to
serve as a proxy for a local labor market’s exposure to rising Chinese trade supplies, but
it is possible that the measure in Equation (1) misses two important channels by which
Chinese exports can affect local employment and wages. The first channel is that China
may displace some of Mexico’s export capacity, and this measure misses the impact of the
potential loss in Mexican exports. I address this issue in a later section by estimating the
total local effect from domestic exposure to rising Chinese export supplies into Mexico plus
international exposure to rising Chinese trade with the U.S.
The second channel that this measure may not account for includes certain kinds of
general equilibrium effects. Using shoes as an example, suppose that Mexico imports only
shoes from China, but not the intermediate goods involved (e.g. leather, rubber). In this
case, the measure captures the direct effect on producers that make shoes, but it does not
capture the indirect effect on producers that make leather and rubber. Presumably, if shoe
producers in Mexico are adversely impacted by increasing competition from China, then
domestic producers of leather and rubber may be adversely impacted as well. If there are
strong agglomeration economies, such that final and intermediate good producers are located
in the same labor market, then the measure here still captures a net effect on local labor
markets. If the supply chain is more spatially dispersed, and (continuing the same example)
if there is a negative effect on both the shoe producers and the leather and rubber producers,
but only domestic imports of shoes increase, then the coefficient on import exposure would
be attenuated. I do not pursue this approach here, but one way of dealing with this channel
would be to construct a regional input-output table using Mexico’s national input-output
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table. Such an approach would capture the effects on local areas via input-output linkages
and allow for the identification of the indirect effect of Chinese imports on sectors in Mexico.
The indirect effect could then be added to the direct effect for each local labor market to
arrive at a measure of import exposure that could be used in the econometric specifications
here.
3.3.3 Data and measurement
Data on wages, aggregate employment outcomes, and human capital come from the Mex-
ican Population Censuses in 2000 and 2010. Information from the 2000 Population Census
is used to provide the start-of-the-period covariates in Equation (2). I use the municipality
as the unit defining a local labor market. In some cases, municipalities have split over time,
and urban agglomerations may sprawl across municipalities. I use identifiers for Mexican
municipalities that use consistent boundaries over time.
I use trade data from the UN Comtrade Database on Mexican imports at the four-digit
SITC (Rev. 2) level. Data on employment by sector in Mexico comes from the Mexican
Economic Census, which is conducted every five years. The last census conducted prior to
China’s entry into the WTO was in 1998. Using slightly lagged measures of employment
reduces concerns with firms adjusting business operations in anticipation of China’s entry
into the WTO and potentially introducing endogeneity into the import penetration mea-
sure. Since the Economic Census uses the Mexican version of the North American Industry
Classification System, rather than the SITC or HC mappings, I build a correspondence table
between SITC and NAICS codes, based in part on the table provided by Feenstra and Lipsey
and filling in missing values where necessary.17 Trade values are converted from U.S. dollars
to Mexican pesos and deflated using the Mexican CPI.
17 Their mapping is provided at http://www.nber.org/lipsey/sitc22naics97/.
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3.3.4 Impacts on local labor markets
To evaluate the impact of Chinese import penetration on the local change in the share
of the working-age population employed in manufacturing, I estimate Equation (2) without
any covariates aside from the measure of Chinese import penetration defined in Equation
(1). Column (1) in Table 3 indicates that every unit increase in import penetration (that is,
a 1,000 peso increase) led to a decline of 0.153 percentage points in the share of the working-
age population employed in manufacturing. This coefficient is statistically significant from
zero at the 1% level. Since the mean of the difference in import exposure is about 11.6,
this indicates that an increase from no Chinese penetration to the average would have led
to a 1.8 percentage point decline in the share of the working-age population employed in
manufacturing, which is slightly below the mean decline observed over the ten-year period
in the data.
Column (2) includes the manufacturing share of employment in 2000 as a regressor. In
general, import penetration is correlated with the manufacturing share, and manufacturing
was slowly declining over this period. Hence, omitting manufacturing share may lead the
import penetration measure to pick up a negative trend in manufacturing. Indeed, the coef-
ficient on manufacturing share is negative, indicating that places with more manufacturing
employment lost relatively more manufacturing jobs, and the coefficient on the import pen-
etration measure becomes much smaller in magnitude. This indicates that once variation in
baseline levels of manufacturing employment is controlled for, variation across how exposed
different sectors were in a municipality to Chinese export supply shocks does not have a
major impact on changes in the manufacturing share. Column (3) includes an additional set
of covariates, controlling for a rich set of baseline characteristics and regional trends that
may be associated with changes in manufacturing employment, to isolate the impact of a
change in import penetration between 2010 and 2000. These controls include the male share
of the working-age population, the share of individuals into each of four mutually exclusive
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groups based on educational attainment,18 the share of the population in agricultural em-
ployment, and the female employment share. Once these explanatory variables are added,
the coefficient on import exposure is now very close to zero.
One possibility, raised earlier, is that the OLS estimator is biased, perhaps because local
demand shocks lead to increases in employment in certain sectors and increases in imports
from China at the same time. This would attenuate any negative effect from Chinese import
penetration. I use 2SLS estimation to address this issue. Column (4) shows the first stage,
where the import measure defined in Equation (1) is regressed on the measure in Equation
(3), as well as all of the covariates in the previous column. The relationship is precisely
estimated and strong, with a Kleibergen-Paap F statistic of 135. The resulting instrumental
variables estimate, shown in Column (5), remains small and not statistically significant from
zero.
Although these results may appear surprising since Autor et al. (2013) find negative
impacts on manufacturing share in the U.S., subsequent work in other contexts has not
consistently found similarly large negative effects. Balsvik, Jensen, and Salvanes (2015)
find negative effects in Norway, but they are much smaller in scope. They estimate that
the Chinese import shock explains less than 10% of the observed decline in manufactur-
ing in Norway. In contrast, Taniguchi (2017) finds that Chinese export supplies increased
manufacturing employment in Japan.
To provide a richer perspective on local impacts and identify effects aside from the ex-
tensive margin of manufacturing employment, I proceed with 2SLS estimation of other labor
market-related outcomes using the strategy outlined above. Table 4 shows the results of 2SLS
estimation of Equation (2) on other labor market outcomes. All specifications include the
full set of explanatory variables in Column (3) in Table 3. The results show that the propor-
tion of individuals with at least secondary schooling and the mean years of schooling among
18 These groups include individuals with than primary schooling completed, individuals with primary
schooling, individuals with at most lower secondary schooling completed, and individuals with at least
secondary schooling. Having less than primary schooling is the omitted category.
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the working-age population both decline [Columns (1) and (2), respectively], indicating that
import penetration leads to a reduction in human capital in affected municipalities. Column
(3) indicates that a 1,000 peso increase in Chinese exports also reduces the proportion of
high-skilled individuals in manufacturing by 0.193 percentage points.19 In Columns (4) and
(5) I evaluate the impact of import exposure on the proportion of the working-age population
that is employed and unemployed, and find a small, imprecisely estimated negative impact
on the former, and a small, imprecisely estimated positive impact on the latter.20
These results provide evidence that even if the overall manufacturing share of the working-
age population is unaffected, the composition of employment in manufacturing, as well as
the composition of the labor force, changes. We see, then, that the effects of Chinese import
penetration are muted once a rich set of explanatory variables is included, pointing to other
drivers as being more important in the reduction of manufacturing employment in Mexico.
Nevertheless, effects on the intensive margin appear to play an important role in altering the
structure of employment in response to the Chinese trade shock.
3.3.5 Wage effects
Table 5 shows the results of estimating Equation (2) on mean log wages at the local
level, with the outcome variable expressed as the difference in log points.21 The first three
columns show OLS results as more explanatory variables are added, and Column (4) shows
instrumental variables results with the full set of covariates. Estimates of the effect of import
exposure are negative and statistically significant from zero in all specifications. The size of
the effect declines as controls are added, but it remains sizable even with a rich set of controls.
The instrumental variables estimate indicates that a 1,000 peso increase in import exposure
19 I define high-skilled as having attained secondary schooling or more, as college education remains rela-
tively rare in Mexico.
20 I also find a positive impact on the log of the overall population that is unemployed. On the other
hand, I find negative impacts on the overall population, employment, and employment in manufacturing,
also measured in logs.
21 I define wages as monthly earnings divided by (4.3 x hours worked per week) for workers with at least
30 hours of work per week. Wages are trimmed at the top and bottom by 2% to deal with topcoding and
zeroes. Results are not sensitive to this specification.
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reduces wages by 0.536 log points. This translates into approximately a 5% relative decline
in wages for a municipality going from the 25th percentile in exposure to the 75th percentile.
That the 2SLS estimate is larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate is evidence of some
combination of measurement error and endogeneity, i.e. of strong local demand conditions
possibly inducing greater imports, which would lead to an upward bias in the estimated
impact of an increase in Chinese exports. Also note that since wages increased over this
period, a negative coefficient here amounts to smaller wage growth in municipalities more
exposed to the trade shock.
I proceed to decompose the wage effect by focusing on subgroups. Table 6 shows the
2SLS results. The effects on men and women are shown in Columns (2) and (3). The results
are remarkably similar. Columns (4) and (5) focus on manufacturing and non-manufacturing
and indicate that wage losses are substantially greater in the former.22 Since I do not have
longitudinal data on workers’ wages, I cannot establish directly whether these changes are
reflected as relative decreases for the same workers or whether differential selection into or out
of manufacturing is leading to these results. However, when combining these results with the
earlier findings on overall employment, human capital, and skill levels within manufacturing,
the evidence indicates that more-skilled workers in manufacturing are replaced with less-
skilled workers. I return to this point when I consider impacts on the conditional wage
distribution in the next section.
3.3.6 Impacts on the conditional wage distribution
A set of studies on inequality in Mexico from the 1990s and early 2000s argued that trade
liberalization increased inequality.23 However, other research has noted that i) the effects
of earlier rounds of trade liberalization may have differed from the effects of the passage of
22 I also look at differences by age group and find consistent results across age by gender cells (results not
shown).
23 A discussion and citations of this work can be found in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007).
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NAFTA (Robertson, 2004)24; ii) Mexico experienced other concurrent policy shocks, such as
labor market reforms, deregulation, declines in the minimum wage (Bosch and Manacorda,
2010), and so on; iii) the effects of NAFTA may have already been priced in prior to its
actual passage; iv) regions across Mexico were differentially exposed to trade, potentially
biasing estimates that did not take this into account (Chiquiar, 2008); v) earlier studies
did not give enough time for Stolper-Samuelson effects to materialize (i.e. an application of
the point made in Slaughter, 2000); and vi) tariff cuts were not evenly distributed across
sectors, but rather affected low-skilled workers the most since they were employed in the
most protectionist sectors prior to trade liberalization (Hanson and Harrison, 1999).
More recent studies, however, document that wage inequality declined in Mexico after
NAFTA, i.e. during the period of study in this paper (Campos, 2013; Lustig et al., 2013)
and provide evidence in support of supply and demand factors for skilled versus unskilled
labor, but do not consider the role that trade might have played. Figure 7 illustrates the
change in mean log wages across Mexico for each quantile in the wage distribution. It is
clear that the greatest gains have accrued to those in the bottom of the wage distribution.
A similar pattern holds if controlling for region.25
It is well-known that trade shocks can impact the wage distribution, depending on the
incidence of labor demand shocks. The results thus far indicate that mean wages decline
and the skill content of manufacturing declines. Chetverikov, Larsen, and Palmer (2016)
propose an asymptotically unbiased estimator, which they refer to as grouped IV quantile
regression, that allows identification of the distributional effects of an endogenous treatment
(i.e. a trade shock) when the treatment varies at the group (i.e. local labor market) level.26
The estimator is applied as follows. First, I calculate the quantile q of the natural
24 To be precise, the trade liberalization of the 1980s led to Mexico’s opening to trade with other low-skill
labor abundant countries, whereas the later signing of NAFTA led to decreasing trade barriers to high-skill
abundant countries.
25 The only exception here is the north of the country, i.e. the group of states south of the states bordering
the U.S., where the effects are evenly distributed across wage quantiles.
26 The reason for adopting this methodology is that conventional quantile regression techniques are incon-
sistent in the presence of group-level unobservables.
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logarithm of wages in each municipality using data from the decennial Population Censuses.
Then I replace the difference of the average outcome in Equation (2) with the difference of the
respective quantile, ∆Y qm. I also continue to instrument ∆Expm with ∆Exp
o
m. The results
for the full wage distribution are shown in Figure 8. The effect appears fairly constant,
negative, and precisely estimated throughout the wage distribution. Splitting the sample
into men and women (see Figures 9 and 10), I find constant effects for men and slightly more
negative effects for women at the upper end of the wage distribution. When I separate the
sample into individuals employed in manufacturing and those outside of manufacturing (see
Figures 11 and 12), I find progressively more negative impacts at the upper end of the wage
distribution for workers in manufacturing. Nevertheless, I cannot reject the hypothesis of
constant effects along the wage distribution.
These results contrast with recent empirical studies on the U.S. and Europe, which
typically show that the least-skilled see the biggest reductions in wages and employment
prospects in response to Chinese export shocks.27 It appears that a greater overlap between
the skill distribution of the importing country and China results in more evenly distributed
negative impacts on wages.28 These results may explain a part of the puzzle in Campos
(2013), who finds that, after increasing during a period of trade liberalization, wage inequal-
ity has declined in Mexico, in part due to a reduction in the return to high-skilled labor. The
findings here indicate that exposure to Chinese trade penetration may have had a slightly
27 Building on the insights in Melitz (2003), a large literature on firm heterogeneity analyzes firm survival
and exit, product upgrading, and skill content in response to trade shocks. This work highlights the impor-
tance of innovation, skill upgrading, offshoring and vertical integration (e.g. Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen,
2016; Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2011; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Costinot, Oldenski, and
Rauch, 2011). Also evaluating the impact of Chinese exports, Mion and Zhu (2013) find that firms with
greater exposure to Chinese export shocks increase wages and employment for non-production workers in
Belgium. A´lvarez and Claro (2009) also find negative effects on plant survival in Chile, but unlike much of
the literature focusing on the U.S. and Europe, they find no evidence that plants adjust to rising Chinese ex-
port supplies by quality or skill upgrading. Instead, they find that plants shift to using more labor-intensive
techniques and producing less complex products.
28 Mion and Zhu (2013), Rodrik (2006), and Schott (2008) note that Chinese exports are more sophisticated
than exports from other low-income countries. Relatedly, Chinese manufacturing wages were lower than
wages in Mexico in 2000, but as of today the situation is reversed. Thus, it is difficult to make a clear
prediction regarding Stolper-Samuelson effects as in the case of a high-income country opening to trade to
a low-income country.
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greater negative impact on workers in the upper end of the distribution in manufacturing,
who are more likely to be high-skilled. This is also consistent with the pattern of inequality
shown earlier between the Decennial Censuses.
3.4 Robustness of the results
3.4.1 Impacts on wages
To check the robustness of these results on wages, I perform several checks on the data.
First, I check whether the largest city in Mexico is driving the results. I re-estimate Equation
(2) omitting Mexico City; the resulting coefficient is shown in Column 2 in Table 7. It is
virtually unchanged from the coefficient on the full sample, which is in Column 1. Since
Mexico City sprawls deeply into neighboring areas, I also re-estimate the main specification
by dropping the city itself, as well as the surrounding states of Me´xico and Morelos from the
analysis. The resulting estimate, in Column 3 of Table 7, is slightly greater in magnitude.
I then check the sensitivity of the results to outliers and drop municipalities in the bottom
and top 3% of import exposure to China. Again, the coefficient increases in magnitude, but
stays statistically significant from zero at the 5% level.
A potential concern with evaluating outcomes between 2000 and 2010 is the financial crisis
of 2008, which spilled over into Mexico by 2009. As Figure 1 indicates, Mexico’s imports
from China decreased in 2009, as the recession dampened economic activity, although imports
abruptly bounced back in 2010 and then continued increasing. I do not have reason to believe
that municipalities disproportionately affected by the crisis were also disproportionately
exposed to Chinese trade exports, but to verify if this is the case, I incorporate data from
the 2015 Population Census. By this point, Mexico had recovered from the recession, so
extending the analysis to a longer time difference allows me to evaluate whether the financial
crisis is leading me to find spuriously negative wage effects in 2010.
A drawback of using the 2015 Population Census is that it does not have the rich set
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of information present in the Decennial Censuses. In particular, it has no measure of hours
worked, so I cannot create a wage variable for full-time workers. Since monthly earnings are
available in 2000, 2010, and 2015, I replace wages with earnings in the main specification.
First, I use the hourly data available in the decennial Censuses to estimate the impact of the
Chinese trade shock on earnings for full-time workers only. The estimate, shown in Column
(5) of Table 7, is close to the estimate using wages, which implies that a negative shock to
wages is driving the decrease in earnings, not a reduction in hours worked.29 In Column (6),
I extend the sample to show results for earnings for individuals with positive earnings. The
full-time distinction makes little difference. Finally, I compare effects across the ten-year
difference versus the fifteen-year difference in the data. The estimate in Column (7) drops
from -0.590 to -0.372, indicating a smaller, though still economically significant, effect across
the longer timespan.
In theory, one would expect labor mobility to eliminate differential labor market-related
outcomes across municipalities in the long run (Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Bound and Holzer,
2000). The smaller effect of import exposure using the longer time difference supports this
view. Note, however, that the Chinese export shock was not a discrete event, but rather a
gradually increasing shock over time. In this sense, the comparison between results using the
2010 and 2015 Censuses is not a straightforward analysis of shorter versus longer horizons
but a more complex function of how the shock has evolved (Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2017;
Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song, 2014). Regardless, that earnings were substantially lower in
2015 in municipalities more exposed to Chinese export supplies indicates that labor market
adjustments were still taking place.
3.4.2 Including the effects of export competition
A potential problem with the measure in Equation (1) in this paper is that it identifies
the effect of rising Chinese exports solely through domestic exposure to imports. This may
29 I also look directly at the impact of import penetration on hours worked and find no effect.
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not be reasonable in the case of an export-oriented economy like Mexico. In an extreme
case, it is possible that Mexico may not even experience an increase in imports from China
in some industries. In that case, the measure used here would not detect a change in local
import exposure. Suppose, however, that Mexico would have exported the output of these
industries to its trading partners in the absence of growth in Chinese exports. This potential
loss in exports is not accounted for in Equation (1).
To capture the effect of Chinese growth potentially displacing Mexican firms that produce
for the domestic market plus the effect on firms that potentially lose exports to the U.S., I













A similar calculation is performed in Autor et al. (2013). The difference from Equation (1)
is in the second summation term. This term weights the change in imports into the U.S.
from China by the baseline share of total imports into the U.S. coming from Mexico in each
industry. This is added to the change in imports into Mexico from China, as done originally.
The measure here estimates the total local effect from domestic exposure to rising Chinese
export supplies into Mexico plus international exposure to rising Chinese trade with the U.S.
Once I include the local exposure to potential losses in the U.S. market, which accounts
for over 80% of Mexico’s exports, the mean change in import exposure rises by about 60%.
When re-estimating Equation (2),30 I find that the impact on manufacturing employment,
once accounting for other important covariates, remains close to zero, as originally estimated.
The magnitudes of the coefficients on wages, shown in Table 8, decline by about half or a
bit less, which is consistent with the measure of import exposure now being scaled up (as
in Autor et al., 2013). The trend in estimates and levels of statistical significance remain
similar to what was found previously.
30 I calculate the instrument in the same manner as before using the new measure of total import exposure
in Equation (4).
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One interpretation of these results is that the majority of the Chinese trade shock is
channeled through its effects on domestic import exposure and not through the displacement
of exports to other countries. The latter point is consistent with the results in Hanson and
Robertson (2010), who estimate that Mexico’s manufacturing export demand would have
been either 0.1% or 0.2% higher (depending on the value of the import price index used)
had China’s export supplies remained constant in the period between 1995 to 2005. That
is a small figure, indicating that China’s growth has not had a large impact on Mexico’s
exports in the period immediately after China joined the WTO and its export growth surged.
However, returning to the interpretation of the results, it is important to note that the change
in imports from China into the U.S. across industries is highly correlated with the change
in imports into the Mexico. Collecting data on the share of local output that is exported
by industry would be helpful in addressing this point, such that one could identify whether
local areas that export the output in a given industry are differentially affected from areas
whose output is sold domestically.
3.5 Conclusion
The so-called “China shock” arguably has been greater in Mexico than in wealthy coun-
tries. Returning to the question posed by Hanson (2010)—“Why isn’t Mexico rich?”—I
evaluate the role that the huge surge in Chinese export supplies has played on Mexico’s
labor markets after China’s accession to the WTO. Contrary to studies in the U.S. and Eu-
rope, I find no negative impacts on manufacturing employment once I control for a rich set of
covariates also affecting the evolution of manufacturing employment. On the other hand, I
find that local labor markets exposed to greater Chinese trade, conditional on baseline char-
acteristics and regional trends, have lower wages, show reductions in average schooling, and
produce manufacturing with a less-skilled workforce. Results from quantile IV regressions in-
dicate heterogeneous effects across the wage distribution in manufacturing, with individuals
in the upper deciles showing slightly more pronounced negative effects.
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These findings indicate that the local response to Chinese trade shocks differs across
developing and wealthy countries. Firms in wealthy countries improve the quality of their
products and hire a more-skilled workforce, indicating that there may be complementarities
between workers in low-income nations and high-skill workers in developed countries. Firms
in developing countries, where low-quality institutions, distorted incentives, and a less-skilled
workforce likely produce barriers to climbing the product quality chain, may instead respond
by cutting wages and becoming more labor-intensive to compete effectively.
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3.6 Figures
Figure 3.1: Growth in Sectors
This figure shows the growth in employment in manufacturing, services, agriculture, and
other goods-producing sectors between in Mexico, using data from the 1999, 2004, 2009,
and 2014 Economic Surveys. All levels are normalized to 100 in the 1999 Survey.
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Figure 3.2: Growth in the Value of Imports from China over Time
This figure plots import trade values from China into Mexico, the United States, Brazil,
Argentina, and Colombia since 1995. All values are adjusted so that numbers in 1995 start
at 100 to show relative trends in growth. Trade values are in 2010 dollars. Data are
calculated using the information provided by the UN Comtrade Database and adjusted for
inflation.
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Figure 3.3: Growth in the Share of Imports from China over Time
This figure plots import trade values from China into Mexico as a fraction of all imports.
Data are calculated using the information provided by the UN Comtrade Database and
adjusted for inflation.
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Figure 3.4: Growth in Imports into the U.S. over Time
This figure plots import trade values from China, Mexico, Canada, and the rest of the
world into the U.S. Data are calculated using the information provided by the UN
Comtrade Database and adjusted for inflation. Values are normalized to 100 in 1995.
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Figure 3.5: Wage growth across Mexican Regions
This figure shows the growth in mean (log) wages across Mexican regions between the 2000
and 2010 Population Censuses. All wages are normalized to 100 in 2000.
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Figure 3.6: Import exposure across Mexico
This figure shows the difference in import exposure between 2000 and 2010 across Mexico
by quartiles. All municipalities are ranked by their exposure, from no exposure (0th
quartile) to most exposed (100th quartile).
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Figure 3.7: Differences in Mean Log Wages across the Wage Distribution
This figure shows the change in mean real log wages between 2000 and 2010 in Mexico
across the wage distribution. Data come from the decennial Population Censuses.
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Figure 3.8: The Impact of Chinese Exports on the Conditional Wage Distribution on the
Full Working-age Population
This graph incorporates the full working-age sample. The figure plots grouped
instrumental variables quantile regression estimates of the effect of a 1,000 peso increase in
Chinese imports per worker. Point estimates and confidence intervals for each quantile are
shown. Units on the vertical axis are log points.
130
Figure 3.9: The Impact of Chinese Exports on the Conditional Wage Distribution on Men
This graph incorporates working-age men only. The figure plots grouped instrumental
variables quantile regression estimates of the effect of a 1,000 peso increase in Chinese
imports per worker. Point estimates and confidence intervals for each quantile are shown.
Units on the vertical axis are log points.
Figure 3.10: The Impact of Chinese Exports on the Conditional Wage Distribution on
Women
This graph incorporates working-age women only. The figure plots grouped instrumental
variables quantile regression estimates of the effect of a 1,000 peso increase in Chinese
imports per worker. Point estimates and confidence intervals for each quantile are shown.
Units on the vertical axis are log points.
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Figure 3.11: The Impact of Chinese Exports on the Conditional Wage Distribution on
Manufacturing Workers
This graph incorporates workers in manufacturing only. The figure plots grouped
instrumental variables quantile regression estimates of the effect of a 1,000 peso increase in
Chinese imports per worker. Point estimates and confidence intervals for each quantile are
shown. Units on the vertical axis are log points.
Figure 3.12: The Impact of Chinese Exports on the Conditional Wage Distribution on
Non-Manufacturing Workers
This graph incorporates workers outside of manufacturing only. The figure plots grouped
instrumental variables quantile regression estimates of the effect of a 1,000 peso increase in
Chinese imports per worker. Point estimates and confidence intervals for each quantile are
shown. Units on the vertical axis are log points.
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3.7 Tables


















Trade data come from the UN Comtrade Database. All trade values are in millions of US
dollars and are not adjusted for inflation.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Mean St. Dev.
Initial share of male population 47.8 1.8
Initial share of population low-skilled 24.6 14.4
Initial share of population medium-low skilled 25.1 4.9
Initial share of population medium-high skilled 26.9 7.0
Initial share of population high-skilled 23.4 11.5
Initial share of population in agriculture 15.8 20.2
Initial share of female population employed 36.2 9.4
Initial share of employment in manufacturing 19.1 10.7
Change in manufacturing share -2.4 2.5
Change in log (wage) 0.2 0.2
Change in mean years of schooling 1.3 0.5
Change in import exposure 11.6 8.0
Change in employed share 0.3 4.3
Summary statistics are shown across municipalities in Mexico, using the working-age
population as weights. All shares are in percentage points. Initial figures are for 2000, and
changes are for the difference between 2010 and 2000. The import exposure measure is in
thousands of pesos in 2010 currency. Shares are in percentage points.
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Table 3.3: Impact of Chinese import exposure on manufacturing share of working-age
population
OLS OLS OLS First Stage IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Import exposure -0.153*** -0.0362* -0.00254 -0.0191
(0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0174) (0.0259)
Manuf sharet=2000 -0.148*** -0.164*** -0.00475 -0.172***
(0.00978) (0.0120) (0.0282) (0.0125)
Male sharet=2000 -0.114*** 0.168 -0.117***
(0.0388) (0.1154) (0.0383)
Share low-med educt=2000 0.0209 -0.0156 0.0201
(0.0173) (0.0277) (0.0172)
Share med-high educt=2000 0.0153 0.0510 0.0162
(0.0181) (0.0360) (0.0180)
Share high educt=2000 -0.0217 0.0755* -0.0270*
(0.0139) (0.0439) (0.0141)
Agricultural sharet=2000 -0.00870 0.0176 -0.0105
(0.00686) (0.01472) (0.00696)
Fem employment ratet=2000 -0.0475*** 0.0246 -0.0505***
(0.00898) (0.0234) (0.00943)
Import exposure (IV) 0.567***
(0.0354)
Observations 2,330 2,330 2,330 2,330 2,330
Region Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable is the share of the working-age population in manufacturing (in
percentage points) in the first set of columns. All models estimate a regression of the
2000-2010 difference in the dependent variable on the 2000-2010 difference in Chinese
import exposure. The first stage regression estimates the impact of Chinese import
penetration into Mexico on Chinese import penetration into five other countries (Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, Spain, and Venezuela). Some specifications contain start-of-period
covariates (as listed). Models are weighted by the working-age population in 2000. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.4: Impact of Chinese import exposure on human capital and employment-related
outcomes
High-skill Schooling High-skill manuf. Employed Unemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Import exposure -0.0974** -0.0118** -0.193*** -0.0445 0.00806
(0.0410) (0.00466) (0.0568) (0.0305) (0.00872)
Observations 2,330 2,330 2,313 2,330 2,330
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable is listed in the column title. All outcomes are calculated as
percentage points. All models estimate an instrumental variables regression of the
2000-2010 difference in the dependent variable on the 2000-2010 difference in Chinese
import exposure. All specifications contain the full set of start-of-period covariates in
column 3 in the first table of results. Models are weighted by the working-age population
in 2000. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
136
Table 3.5: Impact of Chinese import exposure on wages
OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Import exposure -1.056*** -0.781*** -0.319*** -0.536***
(0.148) (0.168) (0.101) (0.131)
Manuf sharet=2000 -0.346*** -0.184** -0.109
(0.0757) (0.0800) (0.0804)
Male sharet=2000 0.2798 0.3103
(0.295) (0.299)
Share low-med educt=2000 -0.633*** -0.625***
(0.203) (0.203)
Share med-high educt=2000 0.257* 0.248*
(0.132) (0.134)
Share high educt=2000 -0.384*** -0.331***
(0.110) (0.114)
Agricultural sharet=2000 0.218*** 0.236***
(0.0540) (0.0538)
Fem employment ratet=2000 0.161 0.191*
(0.103) (0.105)
Observations 2,330 2,330 2,330 2,330
Region Dummies No No Yes Yes
The dependent variable is the difference in the average log wage. All models estimate
either an OLS or an instrumental variables regression of the 2000-2010 difference in the log
wage on the 2000-2010 difference in Chinese import exposure. Some specifications contain
start-of-period covariates (as listed). Models are weighted by the working-age population in
2000. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.6: Impact of Chinese import exposure on wages
All Men Women Manuf. Non-manuf.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Import exposure -0.536*** -0.530*** -0.564*** -0.763*** -0.478***
(0.131) (0.125) (0.158) (0.150) (0.133)
Observations 2,330 2,330 2,324 2,257 2,330
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable is the difference in the average log wage for the group listed in the
column title. All models estimate an instrumental variables regression of the 2000-2010
difference in the log wage on the 2000-2010 difference in Chinese import exposure. All
specifications contain the full set of start-of-period covariates in column 3 in the first table
of results. Models are weighted by the working-age population in 2000. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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The dependent variable is the difference in the mean log wage (first four columns) or mean
log earnings (last three columns). All models estimate 2SLS regressions of the difference in
the dependent variable on the difference in Chinese import exposure between 2000-2010.
The last column estimates a model using the difference between 2000 and 2015. All
specifications contain the full set of start-of-period covariates in column 3 in the first table
of results. Models are weighted by the working-age population in 2000. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.8: Impact of Chinese import exposure on wages (including international exposure)
OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Import exposure -0.600*** -0.461*** -0.227*** -0.257***
(0.0767) (0.0883) (0.0531) (0.0584)
Manuf sharet=2000 -0.318*** -0.147* -0.128*
(0.0717) (0.0771) (0.0730)
Male sharet=2000 0.252 0.254
(0.293) (0.292)
Share low-med educt=2000 -0.620*** -0.617***
(0.203) (0.202)
Share med-high educt=2000 0.241* 0.237*
(0.133) (0.134)
Share high educt=2000 -0.363*** -0.349***
(0.109) (0.112)
Agricultural sharet=2000 0.228*** 0.233***
(0.0535) (0.0528)
Fem employment ratet=2000 0.179* 0.188*
(0.103) (0.102)
Observations 2,330 2,330 2,330 2,330
Region Dummies No No Yes Yes
The dependent variable is the difference in the average log wage. All models estimate
either an OLS or an instrumental variables regression of the 2000-2010 difference in the log
wage on the 2000-2010 difference in Chinese import exposure. Some specifications contain
start-of-period covariates (as listed). Models are weighted by the working-age population in
2000. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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